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ABSTRACT 
After the 9/11/2001 terrorist attack, the President signed Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD 8).  The intent of the directive was to establish a 
mechanism improving our ability to protect against, prevent, respond to and recover from 
any occurrence.  Interim guidance established complimentary initiatives toward a 
national system for developing capabilities: National Preparedness Goal, Universal Tasks 
and Target Capabilities.  The effectiveness of the guidance, however, is hampered by 
several incongruities and conflicting efforts with other similar federal initiatives.  There 
is not one consistent approach either in content or application for identifying or 
developing jurisdictional capabilities.   
The current capability initiative was developed over a short timeframe with a 
focus on the intent of Presidential Directives, Congressional concerns and mandated 
deadlines.  The development of the current initiative was done through consultation and 
not collaboration with all the involved stakeholders.  The research and development of 
this thesis to “Improve the Current DHS Capabilities Framework” relied on stakeholder 
input, years of emergency management experience, and a period of 18 months to study all 
the elements.  The intent of this thesis is to enhance current efforts by proposing a 
framework that is reflective of the homeland security and emergency management 
community or jurisdictional needs. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
To set the stage for the thesis, the following will include an overview and a 
discussion of the document elements.  The thesis elements include:  the issue statement, 
information regarding the literature review conducted, a synopsis of the main argument 
regarding capabilities, the approach to the subject matter research, the significance of the 
research and a synopsis of the chapters to follow. 
A. OVERVIEW 
Two major disasters, within the last six years, have highlighted the importance of 
developing capabilities to prevent, protect, respond, and recover from any type of 
incident, emergency, or disaster.  On September 11, 2001, one of the most devastating 
terrorist attacks occurred in the United States.  The 9/11 Commission Report emphasized 
the inadequacy of the country’s capabilities, “Before 9/11, the United States tried to solve 
the Al Qaeda problem with the same government institutions and capabilities it had used 
in the last stages of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath.  These capabilities were 
insufficient, but little was done to expand or reform them.”1  The report identified 
capabilities as one of the four major failures, “We believe the 9/11 attacks revealed four 
kinds of failures: in imagination, policy, capabilities, and management.”2  On August 29, 
2005, the most devastating natural disaster, Hurricane Katrina, struck the Gulf Coast 
region.  Once again, capabilities fell short of performing as intended.  As stated in a 
Katrina Lessons Learned document, “This demand, coupled with the austere conditions 
throughout the Gulf Coast following Katrina’s landfall, exceeded FEMA’s standard 
disaster delivery capabilities and processes.”3  The attacks of 9/11 delivered the wake-up 
call regarding capabilities and Hurricane Katrina drove the point home.  Secretary 
Michael Chertoff, Department of Homeland Security, drew attention to the importance of 
                                                 
1 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 9/11 Commission Report (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2004), https://www.llis.dhs.gov (accessed June 25, 2007), 368. 
2 Ibid., 356.   
3 White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2006), https://www.llis.gov/member/secure/detail.cfm?content_id=15644 
(accessed June 25, 2007), 49. 
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capabilities in his remarks to the International Fire Chiefs Association, “This tragedy has 
emphasized how critical it is that we ensure our planning and response capabilities 
perform with seamless integrity and efficiency in any type of disaster situation – even one 
of cataclysmic nature.”4  The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities 
for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction was established by Section 1405 
of the National Defense Authorization Act for 1999, Public Law 105-261.  The panel was 
responsible for assessing the federal government support to state and local government in 
combating terrorism.  After the 9/11 attack, the panel was directed to submit additional 
reports.  The final Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities report was 
issued on December 15, 2003 summarizing the findings.  The panel captured the essence 
and criticality of capabilities in its statement, “Moreover, the fragmentation of 
responsibilities and capabilities within the federal structure, among governments at all 
levels, and with the private sector requires our urgent attention.”5   
B. ISSUE STATEMENT 
The events of 9/11 caused the United States to look closely at current response 
and recovery mechanisms among federal, state, local, and tribal governments.  Federal 
efforts resulted in several directives to guide the nation’s development.  Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD 8) and its corresponding National Preparedness 
Goal (NPG) set the stage for a coordinated system of capability development outlining 37 
target capabilities.  The effectiveness of this guidance is hampered by several 
incongruities and conflicting efforts with other similar federal initiatives.  As referenced 
later in this chapter, the work of Davis and Caudle infers the capability initiatives are 
inappropriately designed and not formulated by true collaboration.  In my years of 
experience as a Homeland Security Advisor, the lack of collaboration and partnership has 
provided a recipe for top-down federally directed initiatives verified by consultation with 
                                                 
4 Michael Chertoff, Keynote Address - International Association of Fire Chief’s Leadership Summit 
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, November 2005) http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/speech_0262.shtm 
(accessed June 24, 2007). 
5 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, Forging America’s New Normalcy (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2003) 
https://www.llis.dhs.gov (accessed June 25, 2007), 13. 
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state, local, tribal, and territorial governments.  This method or approach of development 
has not proven the most effective avenue for integrating the guidance into current 
practices that were not considered in the development of an initiative.  In other words, 
there is not one consistent approach in either content or application for identifying or 
developing capabilities. 
The research findings indicated that several incongruities existed within the 
current framework for developing capabilities.  These incongruities led to several 
questions: 
• How do the partners develop a coordinated capability framework when 
federal principles and guidance are uncoordinated with the implementers 
and create development incongruities? 
• How do partners identify the necessary capabilities to develop? 
• What approach should the partners use toward identifying the appropriate 
capabilities that require development to achieve the intended outcome? 
• What process should the partners use to develop applicable jurisdictional 
capabilities?  
• What process should be used to identify a national set of capabilities?  
• Is the current capability development framework adequate to achieve the 
intended outcome? 
The intent of the current capabilities initiative is well intended.  These questions 
and the identified incongruities direct the research to consider a formative approach, 
discovering strengths and weaknesses toward identifying a better architecture.  This focus 
leads directly to the research question, “How can the current Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) capabilities framework be improved?”   
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The subject of capability development is a national initiative to develop 
sustainable efforts across the country to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover 
from any type of incident, emergency, or disaster.  The literature devoted to capabilities 
is found in various federal documents, after-action review material and research analysis 
addressing the subject.  The federal documents and subsequent guidance is the foundation 
material that establishes the developmental direction for capabilities.  This material is 
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categorized as presidential directives, policy reviews, and government reports.  After-
action review material addresses the effectiveness of implementing capabilities.  
Research literature is comprised of academic analysis or publication material on the 
subject.  The following material will discuss each of these elements and the respective 
findings. 
1. Federal Documents 
a. Presidential Directives 
Several directives and federal initiatives establish the basis for capability 
development.  The foundation-setting document is HSPD 8.  HSPD 8 calls for the 
development of the NPG.  “This directive establishes policies to strengthen the 
preparedness of the United States to prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic 
terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies by requiring a national domestic 
all-hazards preparedness goal…and outlining actions to strengthen preparedness 
capabilities of federal, state, and local entities.”6  The NPG is the parent for two 
capabilities based planning documents: Target Capabilities List (TCL) and the Universal 
Task List (UTE).”  The TCL and UTL inform communities and states what they can do to 
bolster their preparedness by providing guidance on specific tasks and capabilities.  The 
National Planning Scenarios provide a basis for a consistent approach for disaster 
planning regardless of the scope and size of the specific scenario.”7  HSPD 8 and the 
NPG are the foundation for the national program, which includes the National Response 
Plan (NRP) and its revised 2007 version, the National Response Framework (NRF). 
 
 
                                                 
6 President, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD 8 (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003 (accessed June 12, 2007), 1. 
7 U.S. Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Department of Homeland Security Statement 
of the Honorable George W. Forseman – Under Secretary for Preparedness (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2003), http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/testimony/testimony_1166567952901.shtm 
(accessed June 10, 2007), 1. 
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Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD 5) is an initiative “to 
enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents by establishing a 
single, comprehensive national incident management system.”8  The initiative is termed 
the National Incident Management System (NIMS). 
b. Policy Reviews 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has issued only one policy 
review report regarding capability effectiveness with respect to the Katrina response.  
The report indicates that capabilities do not provide an efficient mechanism to deal with 
incidents, emergencies, or disasters.  The report reflects that there is much work to be 
done.  
c. Government Reports 
The 9/11 Commission Report emphasized the inadequacy of the country’s 
capabilities.  The report emphasized that capabilities were insufficient and this 
insufficiency is considered one of the four major failures in dealing with the aftermath of 
9/11.9   
The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for 
Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction exposes disconnects between the 
various levels of government and the private sector.10 
2. After-Action Reviews 
All of the after-action review material is a bonified approach to help assess 
capability effectiveness.  The reviews identified that a noticeable deficiency existed  
 
 
                                                 
8 President, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD 5 (Washington D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 2003), http://www,whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003, (accessed June 12, 2007), 1. 
9 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 9/11 Commission Report (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2004), https://www.llis.dhs.gov (accessed June 25, 2007), 368. 
10 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, Forging America’s New Normalcy (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
2003), https://www.llis.dhs.gov (accessed June 25, 2007), 13. 
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regarding capabilities.  There was no apparent divergence in the report documents, only a 
qualifying statement referenced above by Secretary Chertoff focusing on preparedness 
and response capabilities.   
3. Research Literature 
a. Academic Analysis 
Dr. Sharon Caudle completed research regarding the Capability-Based-
Planning (CBP) process and approach.  Her studies indicate that the DHS system is 
flawed and the approach is inappropriate.  She reflects on the Department of Defense 
(DOD) experience in comparison to the DHS approach - the military learned the 
importance of stakeholders and that they should be part of the process to ensure 
ownership.  Meanwhile, the DHS approach used consultants to develop the volumes of 
documents and did not approach the development in a true collaborative partnership with 
the stakeholders, state, and local government.  “The end result has been ‘push back’ from 
key state and local stakeholders, confusion about intent and requirements, and lack of 
understanding of CBP and what it is intended to do.”11 
In researching many other pieces of literature, none of them focuses on the 
CBP process from a global perspective.  In other words, the documents focus on a 
specific aspect of the approach such as assessing the appropriateness of capabilities.  
Other research focuses on applying CBP for specific initiatives such as establishing threat 
assessments.  The unattended piece of the CBP approach is how it may need to be 
adjusted to accommodate the development of capabilities in the homeland security and 
emergency management communities.  In lieu of the fact that CBP may not be the 
ultimate answer to developing capabilities, other methodologies were researched to 
determine their applicability. 
                                                 
11 Sharon L. Caudle, “Homeland Security Capabilities-Based Planning: Lessons from the Defense 
Community,” Homeland Security Affairs I, no. 2 (Fall 2005), http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=1.2.2 
(accessed June 12, 2007), 8. 
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b. Publications 
Paul K. Davis of the RAND Corporation has worked with DOD in 
applying CBP for military initiatives.  The industry theory is that this process has not had 
much exposure outside of that arena.  Davis states, “It is necessary to develop broad 
wherewithal to cope with diverse circumstances, rather than fine-tuning plans based on 
specific scenarios.”12  The Davis information indicates that the federal approach using 15 
scenarios is too specific and not global enough to achieve an all-hazard focus. 
An issue report developed by the Trust for America’s Health addresses 
capabilities with regard to bioterrorism.  The report establishes that capabilities are in 
place at varying levels and much work is yet to be done in the public health arena. 
In summary, all of the referenced documents speak to the CBP process in 
some fashion.  In view of my experience this past five years as a Homeland Security 
Advisor attending many national meetings and conference calls regarding capabilities, 
Davis and Caudle are right on the mark and validate what advisors across the country 
have been experiencing for the last four years.  Homeland Security Advisors have 
expressed their concern to DHS, on more than one occasion, regarding the top-down non-
collaborative development approach.  This approach has caused further disconnects and 
the inability to develop capabilities consistently.  In conclusion, the material researched 
indicates there is a need for uniformity regarding capability development.  There are 
many inconsistencies or incongruities because of the uncoordinated approach among 
federal agencies, and, in partnerships with state, local, tribal, and territorial government.  
Current practice indicates that either CBP or Effects-Based-Planning (EBP) is an 
applicable approach for developing capabilities.  Further research is needed to determine 
whether there are other processes being used that would be more appropriate.  Perhaps 
the result will be the use of another tool, reconfiguring the CBP approach to parallel the 
needs of homeland security and emergency management capability development or 
developing a new tool that is a culmination of those currently available. 
                                                 
12 Paul K. Davis, Deterrence & Influence in Counterterrorism (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 37. 
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D. ARGUMENT 
Capability development is critical to effectively preventing, protecting against, 
responding to, or recovering from incidents, emergencies, or disasters.  State, local, tribal, 
and territorial governments follow federal directives, initiatives, and guidance for 
developing capabilities.  They are held accountable for adhering to the federal parameters 
by virtue of the grant funding requirements and, in Montana’s case, state law.  The 
following is an example of Montana’s requirement under Title 10 Chapter 3 Part 105. 
“The plan and program must be coordinated with the disaster and emergency plans and 
programs of the federal government, other states, political subdivisions, and Canada to 
the fullest extent possible.”13   
The establishment of a coordinated and integrated capabilities framework is 
necessary to ensure the appropriate capacities across the country are in place.  The 
framework must ensure that all elements are integrated to account for cause and effect 
impacts to the outcome.  The development should be a grass roots approach applying an 
all-hazard methodology to achieve the highest probability of federal, state, local, tribal, 
and territorial coordination.  This effort will require considering all current federal 
directives and initiatives, standard development issues and developing the appropriate 
development methodology integrating current CBP research and industry practices.  
Enumerated below, are the most prominent areas for consideration. 
• The foundation terminology must be clearly defined and applied 
consistently.  The current terminology is used interchangeably between 
federal documents and is not applied consistently among capability efforts.  
The development of this element will require the integration of the HSPD 
8 focus aligned with current principles to establish a clear and 
understandable terminology foundation and the intent of the desired 
outcome. 
• The architecture for the capability product must be appropriately 
established to provide direction toward achieving the intended outcome.  
The current architecture has capabilities targeted to specific mission area 
taxonomy: prevent, protect, respond, and recover.  This approach is not an 
appropriate application because capabilities do not specifically reside 
within one mission area.  As an example, the coordination center 
                                                 
13 State of Montana, Montana Code Annotated (Helena, MT: Montana Legislative Services, 2005), 
Title 10 – Chapter 3-Part 105. 
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capability is one that is a common element necessary for every hazard.  It 
is not specific to just the response mission area as alluded to in the current 
TCL.  The main component of HSPD 5 is the Incident Command System 
(ICS).  The ICS system speaks to the appropriateness of strategic and 
tactical capabilities varying from the current capability taxonomy 
approach.  Firescope is a document used in California.  “The content of 
the Field Operations Guide (FOG) is intended to provide guidance for the 
application of the Incident Command System (ICS) to any planned or 
unplanned event.”14  Research of the Firescope ICS operational guidelines 
will be necessary to identify any parameters not currently considered.  
This effort will require a thorough review of the TCL and integration of 
HSPD 5, both complimentary to HSPD 8. 
• The capability development methodology will need to be carefully crafted 
to identify gaps in the current system and alignment with the new 
architecture.  The current CBP and EBP processes are used infrequently 
and new to government application, except for the military discipline.  The 
current DHS CBP methodology is flawed for several reasons: 
• The foundation for CBP development is scenario centric in 
contradiction to the philosophy prescribed by HSPD 8, an all-
hazard methodology. The primary principle behind the terrorism 
focus relies on the fact that state, local, tribal and territorial 
capabilities will be overwhelmed and that is not always the case. 
• The UTL is developed through a mission area analysis.  The result 
of the mission area analysis for tasks confuses the issue as the 
results include capabilities and tasks. 
• Capabilities are a product of a compendium of some 1600 tasks 
formulated under the UTL.  The tasks were not developed in 
reference to capability parameters.  This approach is the reversal of 
what should be done to define tasks based on the defined 
capability.   
The approach to development must begin with a global emphasis and an all-
hazard methodology to meet the true intent of HSPD 8 and identify all possible 
capabilities.  The capabilities can then be further refined by applying the specific threat 
analysis already identified by federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government.  This 
application approach is necessary because it cannot be assumed that all jurisdictions face 
the same threats.  An overlay of jurisdictional threats in correlation to the global 
                                                 
14 California Office of Emergency Services, Firescope – Field Operations Guide ICS 420-1 (CA: 
Government Printing Office, 2007), http://www.firescope.org/ics-8x11-fog.htm (accessed June 25, 2007), 
3. 
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capability elements is a necessary deductive approach to identify any jurisdiction threat 
specific adjustments.  These specifics will set the parameters for appropriate capability 
task development.  The development methodology will require an analytical element.  
The primary focus of capability assistance is based on a tiered approach.  When local or 
tribal capabilities are overwhelmed, they turn to the state for assistance.  Likewise, when 
state and territorial capabilities are overwhelmed, assistance is requested from the federal 
government.  It is not a given that all federal, state, local, tribal and territorial entities will 
identify the same capabilities.  Capability similarities among the various levels of 
government must be identified to promote development consistency providing some 
notion of like outcomes during implementation.  The second component of analysis will 
require identification of implementation thresholds for each capability at the various 
levels to promote an efficient tiered implementation.  Knowing when a given capacity has 
the tendency to be overwhelmed is a necessary preparatory tool for the next level of 
government expected to provide additional assistance.  Preparing capability 
implementation as a transparent effort between federal, state, local and tribal government 
enhances efficiency levels in providing the necessary services to deal with incidents, 
emergencies, or disasters. 
Standard setting initiatives need to be coordinated and integrated into the new 
framework.  Currently, there are two development initiatives competing with the HSPD 8 
capabilities approach.  The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), a division 
of DHS, has embarked on one of the competing initiatives to develop capabilities among 
the emergency management community.  This particular initiative employs standards 
referred to as the National Fire Protection Association 1600 Elements instead of the 
HSPD 8 CBP approach.  In another area, DHS has engaged in a standards development 
initiative with regard to the NIMS.  The initiative is setting standards for emergency 
management development based on parameters or scenarios that are not very 
synchronous with those of the DHS capabilities project.  These initiatives will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter II.  In any case, research will need to be done to determine 
if there are any other similar initiatives.  These types of initiatives must be incorporated 
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into the capability development process to prevent parallel efforts with competing goals 
leading to implementation impediments during an incident, emergency, or disaster.   
E. APPROACH 
HSPD 8 mandated the development of the NPG.  The NPG prescribes the 
development of Target Capabilities and Universal Tasks.  The initiative has resulted in 
the formation of the TCL and the UTL.  The TCL is comprised of 37 target capabilities.  
The UTL is comprised of a multitude of tasks in support of a corresponding capability.  
These products identify the elements that state, local, tribal, and territorial entities are to 
adhere to in the development of their capabilities. 
The thesis research regarding “Impoving the Current DHS Capabilities 
Framework” focuses on the current TCL and UTL system implementation at the state, 
local, tribal, and territorial level.  The approach to this issue is formative in nature.  
Formative approaches include efforts targeted toward identifying the positive and 
negative attributes of the current system.  The intended outcome is to develop a product 
that will serve to enhance policy guidance.  This type of approach is generally qualitative; 
however, the research also captures quantitative results through a survey.  A portion of 
the research includes a general survey using Zoomerang.  The purpose of the survey was 
to validate identified inconsistencies; ascertain the level of understanding and 
involvement of the state, local, tribal, and territorial officials; identify additional areas of 
concern; and, provide insight toward framework development. 
It is important to reach the community that is responsible for implementing the 
federal directives and establishing capabilities.  The survey respondents were state or 
territorial emergency management directors or homeland security advisors and local or 
tribal emergency managers.  These are the individuals responsible for implementing 
HSPD 8, NPG and the development of capabilities.  The instrument attempted to capture 




The survey is comprised of various questions providing an opportunity for 
respondents to explain their reasoning.  The instrument captures which community the 
respondent is associated with and their years of experience.  Subsequent questions 
identify the respondents: 
• Involvement in the development of the current effort. 
• Level of understanding regarding the current effort. 
• Understanding of the current approach. 
• Concerns regarding the current capability development system. 
The information gathered from this portion of the research foundation information was 
used to develop a framework that enhances the current capability initiative. 
F. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
The research identified many inconsistencies in the documents guiding capability 
development.  The outcome reflects on the quality of the guiding documents and the 
accuracy of the CBP literature.  The inconsistencies prove the inadequacy or 
inappropriateness of the guiding documents.  The research affirms the cautions raised by 
the professional literature and enhances the theory that current CBP applications need to 
be revisited.  The research results provide good reason for pursuing other applicable 
approaches to developing capabilities including Effects-Based-Planning or Incident 
Command tactical development. 
The findings and recommendations show the inaccuracy of current development.  
These findings will be beneficial to future research implicating a more global and 
collaborative approach in developing such efforts.  The outcomes also reflect the need for 
a degree of consistency in applying CBP theories, as the guiding documents are 
disconnected and confusing.  The fact that the CBP approach is currently in question and 
being revised for other efforts will lead to concentrated efforts to find the appropriate 
mechanism for development.  The benefactors of this research will be the homeland 
security and emergency management communities.  These professionals (directors, 
planners, and coordinators) at the state, local, tribal, and territorial levels of government 
are the consumers responsible for carrying out the federal directives.  The framework  
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identified in the research is intended to provide consistency to approach and provide a 
more appropriate mechanism for developing capabilities that meets the needs of the 
homeland security and emergency management disciplines. 
The research will also benefit those in charge of developing and implementing 
policy, process, and guidance providing a thorough analysis of their current efforts and 
the guiding principles.  The intent of the outcome is to enhance their efforts toward 
establishing capabilities across the country in a manner that makes sense for those 
responsible for implementation. 
In summary, the research will benefit all those involved in implementing the 
development of target capabilities.  The research will provide both qualitative and 
quantitative results.  These results will help validate any discrepancies or positive 
attributes of the current DHS Target Capabilities effort and provide insight into the 
elements for consideration in developing an enhance framework. 
G. THESIS FORMAT 
The following chapters will guide the reader through the identification, analysis, 
development of recommendations, and future considerations.  The thesis is formatted in a 
logical progression expanding on the components documented above. 
• Chapter II – “The Heart of the Issue.”  This chapter incorporates the 
research necessary to discover the real issues and inconsistencies. 
• Chapter III – “Survey and Analysis.”  This chapter provides a breakdown 
and analysis of the nationwide survey information regarding the current 
CBP initiative.  The information is analyzed categorically by jurisdiction 
and composition to identify the appropriate outcomes. 
• Chapter IV – “Proposed Framework.”  This chapter expands on the survey 
results to develop the proposed framework to enhance the current CBP 
initiative.  The material identifies a logical approach to developing the 
initiative and discusses the implementation pros and cons.  The chapter 
also provides a graphic of the proposed framework. 
• Chapter V – “The Road Ahead.”  This chapter discovers and suggests 
some of the most prominent elements that will need to be considered if the 
proposed framework is adopted.  These “futures” are critical keys to the 
success of the enhanced framework. 
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• Chapter VI – “Conclusion.”  The last segment provides a summary with 
regard to this thesis. 
• Appendices – This information supports the thesis and is not necessary for 
the body of the document, but is pertinent to help develop a more 
complete understanding of the subject or approach.  Appendix C includes 
a list of acronyms for the reader’s reference. 
The next chapter, “The Heart of the Issue,” attempts to expand on the 
incongruities and inconsistencies discovered during the research phase of the thesis 
development.  The content of the chapter is intended to provide a contextual framework 
of the issue in a global sense identifying the cause and effect relationships of important 
elements. 
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II. THE HEART OF THE ISSUE 
The goal of this chapter is establish an understanding of the current Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) capabilities initiative.  The material will discuss the 
foundation elements that have a cause-effect relationship with regard to the initiative.  
The intent of the material is to share the discoveries uncovered during the development of 
this thesis.  The chapter will cover an overview of the subject and include federal 
directives and initiatives, federal approaches, standard setting issues and state 
considerations.  To start the journey, let us begin with the overview material. 
A. OVERVIEW 
“A capability provides the means to achieve a measurable outcome resulting from 
the performance of one or more critical tasks, under specified conditions and 
performance standards.”15  Following its formation in the wake of the September 11, 
2001 attacks, DHS embarked on a mission to develop initiatives to assist tribal and 
territorial government to deal with incidents, emergencies, or disasters.  The basis of the 
approach is founded on the ability to deal with any event regardless of the severity or 
cause - terrorism, man-made or natural - a methodology known as the all-hazard 
approach.  In keeping with this approach, DHS developed a preparedness effort known as 
the Target Capability List (TCL) development initiative.16  The strategic preparedness 
capabilities (planning, training and exercising) called for in this initiative is used to 
develop subsequent functional capabilities to support areas such as emergency 
management, law enforcement, emergency response, public health and others.  These 
functional capabilities are the foundation elements implemented by the appropriate level 
of government to prevent the occurrence of, protect against, response to, and recover 
from all-hazards in a consistent and effective manner. 
                                                 
15 Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Goal (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 2005), https://www.llis.gov (accessed June 12, 2007), 17. 
16 Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Guidance: Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 8 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/assessments/hspd8.htm (accessed June 8, 2007), iii. 
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On December 17, 2003, the President issued Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 8 (HSPD 8).  HSPD 8 and the supporting National Preparedness Goal (NPG) 
are the parent documents the federal government follows for directing the development of 
capabilities embracing the all-hazard approach.  A separate federal partnership initiative, 
however, is coordinating a similar effort that also results in capability development.  This 
initiative began with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which is 
now a subordinate agency to DHS.  “In 1996, FEMA was charged by the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Appropriations to develop national performance criteria to measure the 
capability of the States to perform the emergency management functions of mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery.”17  “In partnership with the National Emergency 
Management Association (NEMA), FEMA developed the State Capability Assessment 
for Readiness (CAR).”18  “The success of this effort is evidenced by the National Fire 
Protection Association (NFPA) using CAR as a basis for the development of national 
emergency management standards (National Fire Protection Association – 1600) and 
using CAR as the foundation for NEMA’s Emergency Management Accreditation 
Program (EMAP) now under development.”19  “The EMAP is a voluntary accreditation 
program based on collaboratively developed national standards for state and local 
emergency management programs which are focused on preventing, preparing for, 
mitigating against, and coordinating the response and recovery from all hazards—natural 
or man-made.”20  The EMAP initiative is based on “15 program elements and 58 




                                                 
17 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Report to the United States Senate Committee on 
Appropriations – State Capability Assessment for Readiness (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 2001), i. 
18 Ibid., i. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Homeland Security Institute, Comparison of the Emergency Management Accreditation Program 
(EMAP) and the Pilot Capability Assessment (PCA) Project (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 2007), 5. 
21 Ibid., 8. 
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capabilities covered under the TCL initiative.  In fact, the EMAP crosswalk with the TCL 
identifies that 15 of the 37 capabilities are not addressed.  The remainder are addressed or 
partially addressed.22 The TCL is based on 37 capabilities.   
Consequently, we have two non-synchronous programs guiding the development 
of emergency management capabilities creating a lack of clarity.  This circumstance 
creates a multi-faceted and uncoordinated approach for capability development.  The 
situation makes it difficult for state, local, and tribal government to complete effective 
capability development efforts.  Developing and implementing the right capabilities or 
knowing when you have exceeded your ability to perform will determine the 
effectiveness and efficiency of a jurisdiction’s ability to deal with incidents, emergencies, 
or disasters.  State, local, and tribal governments rely on the guiding documents to 
conduct their capability development.  It is critical that the federal guidance and direction 
be consistent with other federal partnership initiatives to prevent duplication and 
misdirected efforts among all levels of government.  The following federal directives and 
initiatives will attempt to highlight the reasoning behind the inconsistent approach. 
B. FEDERAL DIRECTIVES AND INITIATIVES 
The DHS is responsible for the implementation of the various federal Homeland 
Security initiatives.  HSPD 8 provides guidance for the development of capabilities to 
strengthen federal, state, local and tribal preparedness.  Based on the organizational 
structure, one would presume the effort was well coordinated.  Outlined below are 
examples of the incongruities discovered that indicate the presumption is not correct. 
• HSPD 8 establishes the NPG to achieve its’ result.  “This directive 
establishes policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to 
prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, 
major disasters, and other emergencies by requiring a national domestic 
all-hazards preparedness goal.”23  The initiative creates a list of 37 target  
 
 
                                                 
22 Nicole Ishmael, EMAP Standard and National Plans Review (Lexington, KY: Council of State 
Governments, 2007), 8 – 13. 
23 President, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD 8 (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031217-6.html (accessed June 
12, 2007), 1. 
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capabilities, TCL.  These elements were developed using a Capabilities-
Based-Planning (CBP) approach utilizing 15 scenarios as the foundation 
for their establishment.  The focus here is only directed toward prevention 
and response.   
• The National Response Plan (NRP) is a derivative of HSPD 8.  It is the 
national framework for response.  Capabilities are grouped into 
Emergency Support Functions (ESFs).  Not all of the ESFs are capabilities 
based as defined in HSPD 8, for example, energy and external affairs.  The 
NRP is the federal planning document responsible for drawing together all 
of the elements in a coordinated fashion.  “Together, the NRP and the 
NIMS (published March 1, 2004) integrate the capabilities and resources 
of various governmental jurisdictions…into a cohesive, coordinated, and 
seamless national framework for domestic incident management.”24  “The 
NRP applies a functional approach that groups the capabilities of federal 
departments and agencies and the American Red Cross into ESFs.”25  
Four of the 15 ESF groupings do not align with the elements of the TCL: 
transportation, public works & engineering, energy, and external affairs.  
The NRP and National Incident Management System (NIMS) issue is not 
congruous with the NPG creating another example of inconsistent 
capability integration for the states to figure out.  The NRP has now 
changed its nomenclature, through its 2007 revision, to the National 
Response Framework (NRF).26 
In view of the fact that the TCL and EMAP efforts exist, separate capability 
assessment initiatives have surfaced.  This duplication adds another level of complexity 
and potential confusion to the national preparedness capability initiative.  Both efforts are 
implemented by the emergency management community in an effort to establish state and 
local capabilities.  The propensity for confusion exists because one effort is driven by 
DHS and the other by its subordinate agency FEMA.  The following will provide some 
background for each initiative highlighting the concerns. 
• The first standard assessment initiative, Pilot Capability Assessment 
(PCA) is led by the DHS.  “The PCA project was initiated to satisfy 
legislative and executive branch requirements outlined in HSPD-8.  That 
methodology was to focus on assessing national capabilities measured 
                                                 
24 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 2004), http://www.dhs.gov/xprepresp/committees/editorial_0566.shtm (accessed June 8, 
2007), 19. 
25 Ibid., 29. 
26 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 2008), http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf (accessed January 28, 2008), 
59. 
  19
against the Target Capabilities List.”27  The PCA effort is focused on 
assessing the TCLs with respect to the program mission areas: prevention, 
protection, response, and recovery. 
• The second initiative is a partnership between FEMA and NEMA with 
respect to the EMAP program.  “Launched earlier this year by FEMA in 
cooperation with EMAP and the National Emergency Management 
Association (NEMA), the assessment project is designed to provide 
information about emergency management and response and preparedness 
capabilities at the state level so that strengths and weaknesses can be 
identified and addressed, future progress can be evaluated against a known 
baseline, and to help target assistance to areas of greatest need.”28  “The 
evaluation of a state's emergency management system is based on the 
EMAP Standard, which covers 14 emergency management functional 
areas drawn from the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1600 
Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management.”29  This accreditation 
effort is focused on assessing capabilities at the state and local level.  The 
standards for the capability assessment are not developed according to the 
foundation principles of HSPD 8, TCL or the 15 planning scenarios.  
These efforts are emergency management function related: preparedness, 
response, recovery, and mitigation.  This capability review is not based on 
the TCL.  It is based on an entirely separate set of standards. 
• The application of the TCL and EMAP assessments is not consistent 
within the various grant programs.  Specifically referencing the 
Emergency Management Grant Program (EMPG) and the State Homeland 
Security Grant Program (SHSGP), “EMAP is discussed in each program; 
the Pilot Capability Assessment is not.  As each program is focused on 
different objectives and outcomes, DHS officials should strive to clear up 
any possibility of conflict between the two grant programs as they relate to 
EMAP and the PCA.”30 
The result is two separate assessment programs structured to improve capabilities 
at the state, local, tribal, and territorial level.  Thus, there are duplicate efforts to  
 
                                                 
27 Homeland Security Institute, Comparison of the Emergency Management Accreditation Program 
(EMAP) and the Pilot Capability Assessment (PCA) Project (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 2007), 3. 
28 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Release # HA-03-NEMBCAP (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2003), http://www.fema.gov/news/release.fema?id-3712 (accessed June 11, 
2007). 1. 
29 Ibid., 1. 
30 Homeland Security Institute, Comparison of the Emergency Management Accreditation Program 
(EMAP) and the Pilot Capability Assessment (PCA) Project (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 2007), 1. 
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accomplish the same goal but founded on a separate set of standards.  The lack of 
consistency and integration for the same initiative is another example of an incongruity 
affecting capability development. 
• Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD 5) complements 
HSPD 8 supporting the NPG.  It establishes the principles for the 
development of the NIMS component.  The HSPD 5 initiative focuses the 
development of capabilities on a separate set of 11 scenarios compared to 
the 15 used under HSPD 8 direction or the NPG.  This initiative only 
addresses two of the elements listed on the TCL: on-site and emergency 
operations center management.  The HSPD 5 scenarios match only 5 of 
the 15 listed under the TCL or HSPD 8: hurricane, earthquake, hazardous 
materials, and nuclear.  As referenced in the “Standard Setting 
Consideration” section of this chapter, the DHS Science and Technology 
division contract with Pacific National Laboratories (PNL) to establish the 
standards for the NIMS initiative.  This entire situation creates another set 
of inconsistencies in criteria for capability development at the federal level 
and the application at the state, local, tribal, and territorial levels. 
• Among the published guidance documents, the terminology becomes 
interchangeable and initiative purposes become unclear.  The 2005 HSPD 
8 guidance states: “The Target Capabilities List (TCL) is a set of thirty-six 
essential capabilities that should be developed and maintained, in whole or 
in part, by various levels of government to prevent, protect against, 
respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks and major disasters.”31  
Contrary to the 2005 guidance, DHS 2007 guidance establishes the 
capabilities as response centric: “The Target Capabilities List (TCL), 
which defines 37 specific capabilities that communities, the private sector, 
and all levels of government should collectively possess in order to 
respond effectively to disasters.”32  Further confusion is generated when 
the guidance references that the tasks for the TCLs facilitate efforts to deal 
with incidents, emergencies, or disasters.  In reality, these tasks are the 
support to developing capabilities. 
• Tasks are the essential ingredients to a capability based on the NPG 
definition.  The 2007 DHS guidance confuses the issue even further as it 
leads a reader to believe that the tasks are responsible for achieving the 
full capabilities focus expressed in the 2005 guidance.  “The Universal 
Task List (UTL), which is a menu of some 1,600 unique tasks that can 
                                                 
31 Department of Homeland Security, Presidential Directive 8: National Preparedness Guidance 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/assessments/hspd8.htm (accessed June 8, 2007), 3. 
32 Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Guidelines (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2007), www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/National_Preparedness_Guidelines.pdf 
(accessed September 23, 2007), 3. 
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facilitate efforts to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from 
the major events that are represented by the National Planning 
Scenarios.”33  The real intent of the tasks is to support the development of 
capabilities. 
All of these document are very prominent and their substance completely valid.  
The strength of these documents lies in the fact that they prescribe to a need for capability 
development and their approach seems very logical.  The weakness among all the 
documents is evidenced by the fact that they do not entirely follow the foundation 
element, HSPD 8, in developing capabilities.  This incongruity creates a contradictory 
approach by the entity leading the development, the federal government.  The salient 
point is that two of the seven national priorities are not synchronous with the HSPD 8 and 
NPG initiatives.  The result is a lack of consistency and coordination in the approach to 
developing capabilities.  These incongruities also cause one to question the validity of 
grant guidance toward applying funding parameters consistently.  The unknown piece is 
the reason behind the lack of coordination between the various initiatives. 
C. FEDERAL APPROACHES  
Homeland Security Advisors and State Emergency Management Directors have 
been cautioning the Secretary of Homeland Security regarding the need to collaborate.  
DHS routinely develops an initiative with a contractor or among the federal agencies.  
The product is then sent to the state, local and tribal partners in consultation to verify the 
appropriateness and quality.  This process creates a real dilemma.  The “verifiers” are the 
majority of the stakeholders responsible for adhering to and implementing the initiatives.  
Asking for their expertise at the end of the assembly line, instead of at the beginning, 
impedes progress because the reality check always finds gaps in the proposal that could 
have been avoided.  According to Albert Ashwood, the development of the new NRF is a 
prime example of true collaboration that acquiesced back to the normal verification 
process.  State Emergency Management Directors devoted hours of their time 
collaborating with the DHS to revise the existing NRP.  After nine months, the NRP 
process stopped.  The entire document was rewritten by the DHS without any stakeholder 
                                                 
33 Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Guidelines, 3. 
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collaboration.  The new document was titled the NRF and changed considerably 
compared to the original NRP effort.  Once again, stakeholders were asked to verify the 
product.  The original comment period was extremely short and finally extended.  Bottom 
line is that the stakeholders generated thousands of comments or remarks that needed 
adjudication by the department.34  A potential underlying issue resides with the 
foundation documents themselves.  There are two incongruities.  First, the authorship of 
the main documents is not consistent.  The directive documents, HSPD 8 and HSPD 5 are 
formulated by the same entity (Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) 
establishing the foundation requirements.  According to a DHS official, the authors of the 
primary supporting documents vary: 
• NRP –  DHS Office of Secretary. 
• National Preparedness Guidelines (TCL/UTL) – DHS Grant and Training. 
• National Incident Management System (NIMS) – DHS Office of Secretary 
(FEMA – original lead; later completed by another entity in DHS).35 
In view of the incongruities identified earlier in the chapter, this inconsistency 
draws suspicion to the clarity and common understanding of the goals and objectives 
between and among the authors to achieve integration of the various components.  
Secondly, the HSPD 8 guidance directs the focus of the DHS efforts away from true 
cooperation or collaboration substituting the element of consultation among all the 
implementing stakeholders: federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government.  
According to HSPD 8, “The Secretary, in coordination with the heads of other 
appropriate Federal departments and agencies, and, in consultation with State and local 
governments, shall develop a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal.”36  The 
NPG creates the same dilemma when it states, “Development of the Goal and the 
planning tools involved extensive coordination with other Federal departments and 
agencies and consultation with State, local, and tribal governments, the private sector, 
                                                 
34 Albert Ashwood (Past President: National Emergency Management Association & Director: 
Oklahoma Emergency Management), interview by author, Helena, MT, August 18, 2008. 
35 David Kaufman (Department of Homeland Security: Director of Preparedness Policy, Planning & 
Analysis Division), interview by author, Washington, D.C., October 4, 2007. 
36 President, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD 8 (Washington D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031217-6.html (accessed June 
12, 2007), 1. 
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and non-governmental organizations.”37  In her research, Dr. Sharon Caudle puts focus to 
the true disconnect that DHS relied on consultants to develop initiatives.  The DHS not 
only relied on consultants, but they traded true partnership and collaboration among all 
the stakeholders for consultation.38 
The lack of action to create a comprehensive collaborative approach will continue 
the proliferation of duplicative efforts between many organizations and uncoordinated 
national efforts.  Several organizations have a consultative influence on the development 
of DHS initiatives.  The HSAC provides the primary guidance.  FEMA organizes two 
separate initiatives to review duplicative initiatives.  Nationally, they have formed the 
National Advisory Council.  Regionally, they established Regional Advisory Councils in 
each of the ten regions and a Regional Interagency Steering Committee.  All of these 
initiatives deal with the development of homeland security and emergency management 
issues.  NEMA membership is primarily comprised of state and territorial emergency 
management directors.  The association has formed a consortium of key stakeholders, to 
include Homeland Security Advisors to weigh in on DHS initiatives.  The National 
Governor’s Association (NGA) has formed the Governor’s Homeland Security Advisory 
Council (GHSAC) to provide input.  Last, but not least, the International Association of 
Emergency Managers (IAEM) provides input to the process.  Except for the HSAC, all of 
these organizations generally weigh in at the outcome side of the equation instead of the 
development phase.  This process further complicates efficiency in developing 
cooperative and collaborative initiatives. 
D. STANDARD SETTING CONSIDERATIONS 
As referenced in the federal initiative section, different standard setting criteria 
are employed for complementary DHS HSPD 8 initiatives.  There are several standard  
 
 
                                                 
37 Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Goal (Washington D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 2005), https://www.llis.gov (accessed June 12, 2007), 5. 
38 Sharon L. Caudle, Homeland Security Capabilities-Based Planning: Lessons from the Defense 
Community, Homeland Security Affairs, I, no. 2, (2005), http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=1.2.2, (accessed 
June 12, 2007), 8. 
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setting agencies: NFPA, PNL, American National Standards Institute (ANSI), and ASTM 
International.  According to an interview with Nicole Ishmael, Director for EMAP and 
formerly the Interim Director: 
FEMA migrates toward the EMAP standard for their development.  The 
EMAP standard is derived from the NFPA 1600 standards.  The DHS 
National Integration Center (NIC) is responsible for the NIMS standards.  
The NIC relies on the DHS Science and Technology (S&T) division for 
the development of those standards.  S&T contracts with Pacific 
Northwest Laboratory (PNL) to develop the NIC standards.  The Incident 
Management Standards Working Group (IMSWG) was established under 
the Standards Area Subject Working group out of Presidential Directive 
10602.  The IMSWG supports the NIC.  Bottom line, the standard setting 
entities operate in a vacuum and no one brings them together to achieve 
true collaboration.39 
Standards are not approached consistently creating room for inconsistent integration.  No 
one standard fully embodies the complete context of the national directives.  Choosing a 
single standard to follow would be difficult due to the lack of consistency and integration 
highlighted earlier. 
E. STATE CONSIDERATIONS 
State law sets the precedent for incorporating federal initiatives into planning 
efforts in preparing for incidents, emergencies, or disasters.  According to Montana Law, 
Montana Code Annotated (MCA) – Title 10, Chapter 3, Part 105, Montana Disaster, and 
Emergency Services is responsible to “prepare and maintain a comprehensive plan and 
program for disaster and emergency services of this state.  The plan and program must be 
coordinated with the disaster and emergency plans and programs of the federal 
government, other states, political subdivisions, and Canada to the fullest extent 
possible.”40  The interpretation is that the state plan must be in concert with the 
directional planning development prescribed by the federal government.  A survey of  
 
                                                 
39 Nicole Ishmael (Interim Director, Emergency Management Accreditation Program), phone 
interview with author, Helena, MT, June 4, 2007. 
40 State of Montana, Montana Code Annotated (Helena, MT: Montana Legislative Services, 2005), 
Title 10 – Chapter 3-Part 105. 
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state and territorial emergency management directors indicated that similar requirements 
exist across the country.  Of the thirty state and territorial respondents, 60 percent or 30 
or the 50 jurisdictions have the same requirement as Montana.    
The SHSGP application requires that the state justify their funding application 
through an enhancement plan.  The enhancement plan requires the state to relate 
strategies or work elements to one of the TCLs’ 37 target capabilities under the NPG.  In 
contrast, the HSPD 5 and NIMS initiative prescribes a slightly different set of capabilities 
and requires “Adoption of the NIMS by State and local organizations a condition for 
Federal preparedness assistance (through grants, contracts, and other activities) beginning 
in FY2005.”41  This requirement makes NIMS adoption and the development of its 
defined capabilities a requirement to receive SHSGP funding.  It is hard to determine 
which precedent for funding is priority.  It is very difficult to meet funding requirements 
that are based on a separate set of criteria for the same initiative: HSPD 8 and the NPG. 
The states, through grant guidance or state law, are required to follow the federal 
principles for developing capabilities.  Based on the situations enumerated above, state 
governments find themselves following several different federal approaches toward 
developing capabilities.  The consequences of trying to follow each approach results in 
duplication of effort and misguided development due to the lack of coordination among 
the federal guiding documents.  Consequently, the funding that is used for these 
initiatives follows the development efforts and results in duplicative or unnecessary 
expenditures.  State general fund budgeting and agency fiduciary responsibility does not 
provide much flexibility for adjusting to fund uncoordinated efforts.   
Another dilemma is created by the fact that DHS grant funding availability is 
diminishing creating an even larger problem toward the achievement of developing 
sustainable capabilities.  States simply cannot afford to allocate their time, personnel, and 
financial resources on uncoordinated efforts; such action is not being responsible in a 
managerial or fiduciary capacity.  Without consistent funding, sustainability and 
coordinated development, program implementation is bound to produce inefficiencies.  
                                                 
41 Federal Emergency Management Agency, NIMS Basic Introduction and Overview (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006), www.fema.gov (accessed June 8, 2007), 2. 
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These inefficiencies could be critical factors in providing assistance during an exigent 
situation.  Any deficiencies can ultimately cost the unnecessary loss of lives and property. 
F. SUMMARY 
The incongruities have created confusion within and among the initiatives 
regarding the intended outcome; there is not an accepted standardized approach.  Instead 
of developing robust and flexible capabilities, the system has created a great deal of 
divergence.  A composite and collaborative approach could be engineered not focusing 
on specific hazards, yet ensuring all-hazard influences were accommodated.  A major 
component of this effort involves integrating the most applicable elements of current 
initiatives: HSPD 8, TCL, UTL, HSPD 5, NRF, and the standard setting documents.  The 
approach must also consider all internal and external influences toward developing 
capabilities. 
The nation’s response to incidents, emergencies, or disasters must be coordinated 
between and among all levels of government.  Based on the author’s 17 years of 
emergency management experience, if nothing is done to correct the current incongruities 
and uncoordinated approaches, the failures experienced in the Katrina response will 
potentially continue to resurface until corrective action has been completed.  Taking 
proactive action to develop a national capability system between the stakeholders among 
all levels of government will maximize efficiencies.  Such an effort will prevent wasteful 
spending, duplication of effort and maximize the use of critical or short resource 
inventories.  A collaborative effort will ensure continuity of approach, consistency in 
operations, clarity regarding authority and provide effective mechanisms to protect the 
citizenry and property affected.   
Elected officials in federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government are 
ultimately responsible to ensure systems and mechanisms are in place to protect the 
citizens and property from incidents, emergencies, or disasters.  The events of 9/11 and 
Hurricane Katrina magnified the need to have a unified response.  The only way to 
achieve a unified response is to build a national system that is developed by the 
stakeholders that are responsible for managing and responding to such incidents.  A 
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unified system cannot be developed through disconnected approaches by various 
organizations and directives to achieve such a goal and develop pertinent capabilities.  
The lack of a proactive approach will cause deterioration of trust for government and 
impede the important preparedness and response efforts that require critical citizen 
participation. 
The following chapter discovers the level of understanding regarding the current 
CBP initiative.  The chapter involves the analysis of the subject matter using the results 
of a nationwide survey.  The survey results are captured categorically: state/territorial, 
local and tribal.  The data compartmentalization allows for a thorough jurisdictional 
analysis.  
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III. SURVEY AND ANALYSIS 
A nationwide survey comprised of 14 questions was conducted to ascertain the 
level of understanding with regard to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
Capability-Based-Planning (CBP) initiative to develop target capabilities.  The primary 
focus of the survey set out to determine the level of understanding, involvement and 
implementation regarding the DHS capabilities framework among state/territorial, local 
and tribal homeland security and emergency management professionals.  The secondary 
purpose of the survey focused on determining the applicability among state/territorial, 
local, and tribal jurisdictions regarding the 15 scenarios used to develop the Target 
Capabilities.  Ultimately, the survey structure allowed the identification of potential 
elements that would enhance the current CBP initiative. 
The survey was distributed to the homeland security and emergency management 
community among the state/territorial, local, and tribal sectors and 185 respondents 
completed the survey among the three discipline areas.  The survey was formatted to 
obtain both qualitative and quantitative results.  Respondents were given the opportunity 
to comment on the subject matter.  The following positive comments were received with 
regard to the CBP initiative: 
• DHS has provided adequate material. 
• It is appropriate for DHS to provide a reference point to guide state and 
local jurisdiction activities. 
• It seems to be a very detailed and excellent document. 
• It is a much needed and long overdue effort to standardize capability 
assessment. 
• Excellent foundation, guidelines, and resource. 
• The Target Capabilities List (TCL) clearly defines the capabilities to 
achieve levels of preparedness. 
The number of negative comments outweighed the positive comments; however, 
the constructive content of the comment held the gems of information.  The constructive 
nature of the comments provided a great deal of insight.  These insights and the survey 
results captured the identification of the elements that state/territorial, local, and tribal 
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homeland security and emergency management professionals felt were applicable toward 
enhancing the current CBP initiative.  This chapter provides an overview of the survey 
approach, the results, and respective analysis and concludes with a summary of the 
identified applicable elements. 
A. APPROACH 
It is important to reach the community that is responsible for implementing the 
federal directives and establishing capabilities to determine its effectiveness.  The survey 
involves respondents from state or territorial emergency management, state homeland 
security advisors, tribal emergency management, and local jurisdictions.  Zoomerang 
technology was used to conduct a nationwide survey categorizing jurisdictional 
responses.  The respondents were accessed directly or through their respective 
associations: National Emergency Management Association, National Governor’s 
Association and the International Association of Emergency Managers.  The data was 
captured in three separate files to provide an analysis capability of the distinct disciplines: 
state/territorial, tribal and local.  The value of the architecture allowed for independent 
and aggregate analysis to depict any distinct differences or similarities and yield a 
composite result. 
The structure of the survey provided the opportunity to conduct a quantitative and 
qualitative analysis.  The survey included a series of questions with the opportunity to 
provide a “yes” or “no” answer to satisfy the quantitative desire.  Each question included 
a comment section to provide for a qualitative analysis opportunity.  In an effort to fulfill 
the primary purpose of the survey, the data analysis focused on organizing the questions 
and their respective comments as they pertained to the four critical areas of 
concentration: understandable approach, initiative clarity, value to the discipline and level 
of collaboration. 
The scenario section design allowed the analysis to compare the applicability of 
the 15 DHS scripted scenarios with other historically identified events.  The survey 
identified 24 scenarios, with one category called “other” as a placeholder for non- 
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identified events.  The Target Capabilities’ scenarios accounted for 62.5% of the events, 
while the additional categories represented 37.5% of the possible selections.  Participants 
identified the scenarios that were the most prominent in their jurisdiction. 
The raw data is captured in a spreadsheet format.  Due to the nature of the survey 
confidentiality, the raw data is not included in this document.  A sanitized composite 
summary of the results and comments in a spreadsheet format was developed.  The 
spreadsheet is void of all references to respondents, any direct reference that may 
implicate agency personnel and comments are summarized reflecting the general nature 
of the respondents’ input.  The information used in the body of this document is a 
summary of the composite information. 
B. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The survey results are divided into discipline specific sections: local, 
state/territorial and tribal.  A fourth section represents an aggregate of all the discipline 
survey information.  Immediately following each section is an analysis of the 
information.  The result sections include a breakdown of respondents’ experience, a table 
of survey data sorted by the coding areas of concentration referencing the pertinent 
survey questions and a graph depicting the most applicable scenarios for the discipline.  
The table of survey data includes a positive column reflecting the percent of “yes” 
answers to the question and a negative column depicting the percent of “no” answers to 
the question.  The comments are summarized from the composite summary referenced 
above. 
1. Local Results 
The local respondents submitting a survey totaled 122.  Their years of experience 
in emergency management or homeland security are depicted in the following table. 
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Table 1.   Local Respondents Years of Experience in Emergency Management or 
Homeland Security 
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE                          # RESPONDENTS           % OF TOTAL 
0-5 33 27% 
6-10 30 25% 
11-15 15 12% 
16-20 20 16% 
21 & above 24 20% 
 
The local survey results are depicted in Table 2.  Comment summaries are not 
necessarily reflective of a “yes” or “no” response.  The comment summaries are 
reflective of the constructive criticisms that provide insight to enhancing the current CBP 
initiative.  The table structure is focused on organizing the questions and their respective 
comments as they pertained to the four critical areas of concentration: understandable 
approach, initiative clarity, value to the discipline and level of collaboration.  The table is 
sorted by area of concentration referencing the applicable question. 
  33
Table 2.   Local Survey Results 
LOCAL SURVEY RESULTS 
QUESTION # SURVEY QUESTION 
(122 
Respondents) COMMENT SUMMARY CONCENTRATION
  POS NEG     
2 
Do you agree with the 
Department of Homeland 
Security approach to 
capability development? 
52% 48% 
 DHS does not have a 
firm understanding of 
local issues. 
 Initiative needs a 
bottoms-up, be inclusive 
and include local input. 
APPROACH 
6 
Please explain your 
agency's approach to 
capability development in 
the comment box below 
    
 Initiative depicted as 
needing a sense of 
realism. 
 Majority of local 
approaches were based 




 Other local approaches 
were based on NIMS, 
ESFs, functional 
concentration or public 
health capabilities. 
 Strongly noted that 
limited funding was an 
impeding factor to 
achieving any progress.   
APPROACH 
8 
Do you feel there is a better 
approach to developing 
capabilities? 
60% 40% 




consistent oversight and 
benchmarks. 
 Need to establish a goal 
and a framework that is 
scalable identifying gaps 






Do you have any comments 
about the federal guidance 
regarding capabilities? 
    
 Comments varied from 
“haven't seen guidance” 
to “unrealistic or too 
complex and 
ambiguous.” 
 Additional comments 
that it "seems we are 
moving in the right 
direction." 
 Identified that focus 
needs to involve input 




LOCAL SURVEY RESULTS 
QUESTION # SURVEY QUESTION 
(122 
Respondents) COMMENT SUMMARY CONCENTRATION
1 
Do you understand the 
Department of Homeland 
Security approach to 
developing capabilities? 
76% 24% 
 Not a clue or very 
limited understanding to 
understand fully. 
 Positive responses 
questionable in lieu of 
descriptive terms like 
"seems okay,” "mostly" 
and "capabilities beyond 
our ability."  
CLARITY 
5 
Do you understand the 
interdependencies between 
the Target Capabilities List 
and the Universal Task 
List? 
66% 34% 
 Indicate the effort is too 
complicated. 
 Summarily little 
understanding with 
descriptive statements 
like "I think so 
philosophically" and 
"barely understand.”   
CLARITY 
10 
Were you a member of any 
Department of Homeland 
Security committee 
engaged in the Capability 
development effort? 4% 96% 
 Unequivocally very 
limited local input. 
COLLABORATION 
11 
Were you consulted, at any 




 Limited consultation 
only. 
 Effort perceived as too 
federally focused with 
little regard for 
concerted local inputs in 
exchange for an internal 
DHS approach with no 
objectivity.   
COLLABORATION 
3 
Does your agency use the 
Target Capabilities List to 
identify the capabilities it 
needs to develop? 
57% 43% 
 Limited use as an 
assessment tool. 
 Some use as a reference. 
 Most use because tied to 





Does your agency use the 
Universal Task List to 
identify the tasks it needs to 








 Cannot find them on the 
web to use as a 
reference. 




Please explain why your 
agency uses the approach 
described in number 6 in 
the comment box below 
    
 Approach was 
understandable. 
 Made sense from a 
historical and realistic 
perspective. 
 Our approach was 
tailored to jurisdiction 





The following chart depicts the applicable scenarios identified by local survey 
respondents with respect to their jurisdictional hazard and threats.  Survey respondents 
were able to choose the hazards or threats that were most applicable to their area.  The 
chart identifies the scenarios listed in the survey and captures the number of respondents 
that chose each scenario.   
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Chart 1.   Scenario Applicability to Local Jurisdictions 
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2. Local Analysis 
The respondents represented each categorical level of experience.  Only 27% of 
the respondents were new to the discipline after 9/11.  The majority of the respondents, 
73%, were members of their profession at the time of 9/11 or before.  Almost one-half of 
the respondents, 48%, have 11 or more years of experience.  The respondents represented 
a good cross section of experience levels for the survey with a significant portion being 
seasoned professionals.  The survey results do not represent a generalization of the local 
disciplines nationwide.  “Generalizations require a survey response from 50% or more of 
the respondent population.”42  Because Montana alone has 56 emergency management 
professionals, the generalization qualification is not satisfied with a nationwide 
respondent sample of 122.  The responses, however, can be targeted as a nationwide 
indicator for the local discipline.  The information captured and categorized by area of 
concentration is as follows: 
• Approach – respondents were split (52% vs. 48%) with regard to agreeing 
with the DHS TCL initiative.  Most of the respondents (60%) felt that 
there is a better approach to capabilities.  Comments indicated that DHS 
did not have an understanding of local issues.  Current local approaches 
varied among a variety of guiding elements: hazard vulnerability analysis, 
Emergency Support Functions or National Incident Management System 
(NIMS).  The respondents felt the initiative should involve more of a 
bottoms-up or grass roots all-hazard approach.  The targeted elements 
needed to focus on a scalable framework with established goals, gaps, and 
benchmarks blending standards and performance.  The comments depicted 
a sense of irrelevancy in the current approach by references to too 
complex, too terrorism centric, focused on federal emphasis instead of 
state and local, no consensus on resultant outcome, need to determine 
acceptable risk, need to focus on preparedness and not being able to meet 
criteria.   
• Clarity – respondents indicated a better than average understanding of the 
DHS Target Capabilities List (TCL)  and Universal Task List (UTL) 
interdependencies, 76% and 66% positive responses respectively.  These 
percentages are questionable as comments used to qualify the answers 
included ambiguous terms such as, “seems okay,” “I think so,” “barely 
understand” and “I think so philosophically.”   
                                                 
42 William Pelfrey (Academic Associate, Naval Postgraduate School), interview with author, 
Monterey, CA, April 11, 2008. 
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• Collaboration – responses indicated there was virtually no collaboration, 
only consultation, with any local disciplines during development of the 
DHS Target Capabilities initiative.  Local input was disregarded and 
replaced by internal DHS non-objective based efforts. 
• Value – respondents were split with regard to either the TCL or UTL 
efforts.  Both efforts were referenced as guides and not accepted practices.  
The local disciplines valued initiatives that were more realistic, based on 
historical perspective and tailored to jurisdictional needs.  Some 
irrelevancy in value was noted by comments that the current efforts were 
not commensurate with current industry standards like the National Fire 
Protection Association (NFPA) or were too heavily reliant on large 
department abilities. 
Local respondents indicated in the survey that the Target Capabilities initiative 
was too terrorism focused and development should be based on what is pertinent to the 
jurisdiction.  The chart section indicates that respondents find non-terrorism related 
scenarios to be more prominent for their jurisdictions.  The 122 respondents identified 
1022 scenarios pertinent to their respective jurisdictions.  While the terrorism scenarios 
account for almost two-thirds of the available choices in the survey, terrorism events only 
accounted for 54.7% of the selections.  The non-terrorism related scenarios accounted for 
43.3% of the selections.  The chart identifies Pandemic Influenza, Wild land Fire, Flood, 
Winter Storm, and Tornado as the top five choices.  These selections validate the 
respondent comments regarding the “too terrorism focused” concern as 80% or 4 out of 
the 5 top choices are naturally occurring events that were not considered in the DHS 
capability development model.  If DHS were to have chosen the top 15 scenarios most 
likely of concern to local jurisdictions, the list in ranked order would appear as follows 
(** indicates scenario as one of the 15 DHS scenarios): 
• Flood        81% 
• Winter Storm       73% 
• Pandemic Influenza**     57% 
• Wild land Fire       55% 
• Tornado       52% 
• Explosive Attack – Improvised Explosive Device**  44% 
• Chemical Attack – Chlorine Tank Explosion **  41% 
• Major Earthquake**      41% 
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• Cyber Attack**      39% 
• Chemical Attack – Toxic Industrial Chemicals**  37% 
• Dam Failure       34% 
• Major Hurricane**      34% 
• Biological Attack – Food Contamination**   33% 
• Biological Attack – Foreign Animal Disease**  29% 
• Other        28% 
(Other included hazmat, severe wind, crop disease, drought, shooting, nuclear power 
plant incident, avalanche, mudslide, civil disturbance, extreme heat) 
Only nine of these events (denoted by: **) are parts of original DHS 15 scripted 
scenarios for the capabilities initiative. 
 
3. State/Territorial Results 
The state/territorial respondents submitting a survey totaled 57.  Their years of 
experience in emergency management or homeland security are depicted in the following 
table. 
Table 3.   State/Territorial Respondents Years of Experience in Emergency Management 
or Homeland Security 
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE                          # RESPONDENTS           % OF TOTAL 
0-5 11 19% 
6-10 11 19% 
11-15 9 16% 
16-20 7 12% 
21 and above 19 33% 
 
The state/territorial survey results are depicted in the following table.  Comment 
summaries are not necessarily reflective of a yes or no response.  The comment 
summaries are reflective of the constructive criticisms that provide insight to enhancing 
the current CBP initiative.  The table structure is focused on organizing the questions and 
their respective comments as they pertained to the four critical areas of concentration:  
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understandable approach, initiative clarity, value to the discipline and level of 
collaboration.  The table is sorted by area of concentration referencing the applicable 
question. 
Table 4.   State/Territorial Survey Results 
STATE/TERRITORIAL SURVEY RESULTS 






    POS NEG     
2 
Do you agree with the 
Department of Homeland 
Security approach to 
capability development? 
51% 49% 
 "Capability to do 
what?" 
 Current development is 
inconsistent, 
unmanageable, and too 
ad hoc and involves 
inappropriate scenario 
focus. 
 Needs to be a bottoms-
up approach developed 
on locally known 
scenarios and hazards 
defined by realistic 
activities and 
acquisitions to achieve 
readiness with 
identified gaps.   
APPROACH 
6 
Please explain your agency's 
approach to capability 
development in the 
comment box below 
    
 No real consistent 





priorities set by 
leadership, and 
initiatives determined 
by grant funding. 
 Need surfaced to 
identify gaps and 




Do you feel there is a better 
approach to developing 
capabilities? 
58% 42% 
 Need to use a 
sustainable integrated 
systems functional 
approach based on 
more of a national 
discussion. 
 Need a state strategic 





STATE/TERRITORIAL SURVEY RESULTS 






    POS NEG     
12 
Do you have any comments 
about the federal guidance 
regarding capabilities? 
    
 Driven by fears of least 
likely events, 
completely void of 
state input. 
 Initiative is too long, 
too detailed, too 
prescriptive, and 
lacking measurement. 


















Do you understand the 
Department of Homeland 
Security approach to 
developing capabilities? 
82% 18% 
 Effort not clearly 
understood by DHS 
lacking clarity in 
approach that is too 
convoluted and 
military centric. 
 Initiative flawed by 
frequent changes in 
contractors and DHS 
misdirection. 
 DHS changing focus 
between capability and 
task based approach.   
CLARITY 
5 
Do you understand the 
interdependencies between 
the Target Capabilities List 
and the Universal Task List? 75% 25% 
 Understand the theory, 
but too convoluted and 
impractical. CLARITY 
10 
Were you a member of any 
Department of Homeland 
Security committee engaged 
in the Capability 
development effort? 12% 88% 
 No Comments. 
COLLABORATION 
11 
Were you consulted, at any 










Does your agency use the 
Target Capabilities List to 
identify the capabilities it 
needs to develop? 
74% 26% 
 Only use as a guide or 
building block due to 
inability to aggregate 






Does your agency use the 
Universal Task List to 
identify the tasks it needs to 
consider for capability 
development? 53% 47% 
 No agreement 
for utilizing TCLs. 





STATE/TERRITORIAL SURVEY RESULTS 






    POS NEG     
7 
Please explain why your 
agency uses the approach 
described in number 6 in the 
comment box below 
 
    
 Our approach is 




 DHS initiative is non-
coordinated and done 
in a vacuum. 
VALUE 
 
The following chart depicts the applicable scenarios identified by state/territorial 
survey respondents with respect to their jurisdictional hazard and threats.  Survey 
respondents were able to choose the hazards or threats that were most applicable to their 
area.  The chart identifies the scenarios listed in the survey and captures the number of 
respondents that chose each scenario.  
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4. State/Territorial Analysis 
The respondents represented each categorical level of experience.  Only 19% of 
the respondents were new to the discipline after 9/11.  The majority of the respondents, 
81%, were members of their profession at the time of 9/11 or before.  Over one-half of 
the respondents, 61%, have 11 or more years of experience.  The respondents represented 
a good cross section of experience levels for the survey with a majority being seasoned 
professionals.  The survey results represent a generalization of the state/territorial 
disciplines nationwide.  Generalizations require a survey response from 50% or more of 
the respondent population.  There are 56 state/territorial jurisdictions with an emergency 
management director and/or homeland security advisor.  That combination provides a 
potential for 112 responses from this community.  A comparison of the directors and 
advisors reveals that 11 individuals hold both positions.  This circumstance reduces the 
potential respondents to 101.  The survey results noted 57 respondents equaling 56% of 
the respondent population indicating the responses can be considered a generalization of 
the respondent population.  The information captured and categorized by area of 
concentration is as follows: 
• Approach – respondents were split (51% vs. 49%) with regard to agreeing 
with the DHS TCL initiative.  Most of the respondents (58%) felt that 
there is a better approach to capabilities.  Comments indicated that the 
DHS approach lacks the use of appropriate scenarios and is void of state 
input and a manageable consistent framework.  The current initiative is 
characterized as “more bureaucratic than functional driven by fears of 
least likely events.”  Respondents indicated that the approach needs to be 
more inclusive indicative of a grass roots or bottoms-up type effort 
founded on known local scenarios and hazards.  Current state/territorial 
approaches varied among a variety of guiding elements: gaps, leadership 
priorities, hazard vulnerability analysis, and grant funding requirements.  
The targeted elements need to focus on a national discussion regarding a 
sustainable and integrated systems based functional approach identifying 
gaps and the necessary resources.  The comments depicted a sense of 
irrelevancy in the current approach by references to capabilities being 
abstract, ineffective implementation of an initiative based on homeland 
security funding prioritization after bulk of grant dollars were spent and 
non applicable scenarios.  The comments also reflected that there was “no 
clarity in approach,” the current initiative was not a “cookie cutter 
solution” and what worked in New York does not necessarily work in 
other jurisdictions. 
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• Clarity – respondents indicated a that a majority understood the DHS 
TCL and UTL interdependencies, 82% and 75% positive responses 
respectively.  The comments, however, indicated a disagreement with the 
initiative being too convoluted, military centric, impractical, misdirected, 
and not understood by DHS. 
• Collaboration – responses indicated there was minimal collaboration or 
involvement by state/territorial jurisdictions in the development of the 
Target Capabilities initiative.  Only 12% of the respondents were engaged 
via some form of committee work and 23% were consulted in some 
manner regarding the initiative.  Comments indicated there was limited 
inclusion and the feedback given to DHS was ignored. 
• Value – respondents indicated they used the TCL and UTL, 74% and 53% 
respectively.  The comments, however, indicated the directed use is as a 
guide or building block.  There is no consensus for using the TCL as the 
system as it is “way too cumbersome” and lacks federal implementation 
assistance.  Other approaches are being used that are understandable and 
collaborative, unlike the “DHS vacuum approach.”  Some irrelevancy in 
value was noted by comments that the current efforts were too confusing 
not reflective of decisions made at the state level and seen as a “paperwork 
shuffle.”  The number of tasks is seen as totally unmanageable and “the 
list is so onerous it overwhelms one’s sensibilities to ever process.” 
State/territorial respondents indicated in the survey inappropriateness with respect 
to the scenarios used in the Target Capabilities initiative and should be based on the 
events and hazards relevant to the jurisdiction.  The chart section indicates that 
respondents find non-terrorism related scenarios to be more prominent for their 
jurisdictions.  The 57 respondents identified 512 scenarios pertinent to their respective 
jurisdictions.  While the terrorism scenarios account for almost two-thirds of the available 
choices in the survey, terrorism events only accounted for 56.4% of the selections.  The 
non-terrorism related scenarios accounted for 43.6% of the selections.  As in the local 
results, the chart identifies Pandemic Influenza, Wild land Fire, Flood, Winter Storm, and 
Tornado as the top five choices.  These selections validate the respondent comments 
regarding the “scenario inappropriateness” concern, as 80% or 4 out of the 5 top choices 
are naturally occurring events that were not considered in the DHS capability 
development model.  If DHS were to have chosen the top 15 scenarios most likely of 
concern to state/territorial jurisdictions, the list in ranked order would appear as follows 
(** indicates scenario as one of the 15 DHS scenarios): 
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• Flood        82% 
• Winter Storm       79% 
• Biological Disease Outbreak - Pandemic Influenza** 65% 
• Wild land Fire       54% 
• Tornado       53% 
• Cyber Attack**      49% 
• Explosive Attack - Improvised Explosive Device**  46% 
• Chemical Attack - Chlorine Tank Explosion**  44% 
• Dam Failure       44% 
• Major Earthquake**      42% 
• Major Hurricane**      40% 
• Biological Attack - Food Contamination**   37% 
• Chemical Attack - Toxic Industrial Chemicals**  33% 
• Biological Attack - Foreign Animal Disease**  33% 
• Other        32%  
(Other included hazmat, severe wind, drought, shooting, mudslide) 
Only 9 of these events (denoted by: **) are parts of original DHS 15 scripted scenarios 
for the capabilities initiative. 
5. Tribal Results 
The tribal respondents submitting a survey totaled six.  Their years of experience 
in emergency management or homeland security are depicted in the following table. 
Table 5.   Tribal Respondents Years of Experience in Emergency Management or 
Homeland Security 
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE                           # RESPONDENTS           % OF TOTAL 
0-6 2 33% 
6-11 1 17% 
11-16 0 0% 
16-21 3 50% 
22 & above 0 0% 
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The state/territorial survey results are depicted in the following table.  Comment 
summaries are not necessarily reflective of a yes or no response.  The comment 
summaries are reflective of the constructive criticisms that provide insight to enhancing 
the current CBP initiative.  The table structure is focused on organizing the questions and 
their respective comments as they pertained to the four critical areas of concentration: 
understandable approach, initiative clarity, value to the discipline and level of 
collaboration.  The table is sorted by area of concentration referencing the applicable 
question. 
Table 6.   Tribal Survey Results 
TRIBAL SURVEY RESULTS 




    P0S NEG     
2 
Do you agree with the 
Department of Homeland 
Security approach to 
capability development? 
83% 17% 
 Skewed approach dating 
back to Civil Defense 
days with limited 
funding and a lack of 
coordination between 
federal entities to reduce 




Please explain your 
agency's approach to 
capability development in 
the comment box below 
    
 No consistent approach. 
 Foundation for 
development varies in 
orientation: response 
centric, mitigation 




Do you feel there is a better 
approach to developing 
capabilities? 
67% 33% 
 Suggest improved 
regional approach and 
trained SMEs from the 
state to assist. 
 Challenged by education 
and language barriers. 
APPROACH 
12 
Do you have any comments 
about the federal guidance 
regarding capabilities? 
    
 Lack of financial 
capability and 
identification of true 
Indian Nation needs. 
 Indian Nation direction 
implemented according 
to tribal leader direction 
APPROACH 
1 
Do you understand the 
Department of Homeland 





significant gaps between 
sovereignties excluding 
other federal influences 
on tribal government: 
BIA, BIE, IHS and EPA  
CLARITY 
  47
TRIBAL SURVEY RESULTS 




    P0S NEG     
5 
Do you understand the 
interdependencies between 
the Target Capabilities List 
and the Universal Task 
List? 
50% 50% 
 Comments reflect a 




are the subject of 
comments: vulnerable 
sites, remoteness, and 
financial resources.   
CLARITY 
10 
Were you a member of any 
Department of Homeland 
Security committee 
engaged in the Capability 
development effort? 
0% 100% 
 No Comment. 
COLLABORATION 
11 
Were you consulted, at any 




 No Comment. 
COLLABORATION 
3 
Does your agency use the 
Target Capabilities List to 
identify the capabilities it 
needs to develop? 
67% 33% 
 Limited use driven by 
grant requirements. 
 Use impeded by 
inapplicable value 
because of sovereignty 
issues.   
VALUE 
4 
Does your agency use the 
Universal Task List to 
identify the tasks it needs to 
consider for capability 
development? 50% 50% 
 Limited use as a guide 





Please explain why your 
agency uses the approach 
described in number 6 in 
the comment box below 
    
 No consistent reason; 








The following chart depicts the applicable scenarios identified by tribal survey 
respondents with respect to their jurisdictional hazards and threats.  Survey respondents 
were able to choose the hazards or threats that were most applicable to their area.  The 
chart identifies the scenarios listed in the survey and captures the number of respondents 
that chose each scenario.   
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Chart 3.   Scenario Applicability to Tribal Jurisdictions  
6. Tribal Analysis 
The respondents represented 4 of the 5 categorical levels of experience.  After 
9/11, 33% of the respondents were new to the discipline.  The majority of the 
respondents, 67%, were members of their profession at the time of 9/11 or before.  One-
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half of the respondents, 50%, have 11 or more years of experience.  The tribal response is 
very minimal at six responses compared to the over 400 tribes in the United States.  The 
survey results cannot be generalized to the tribal community and can only be seen as an 
indicator.  The information captured and categorized by area of concentration is as 
follows: 
• Approach – the majority of the respondents understood the DHS TCL 
initiative, 83% vs. 17%.  Most of the respondents (67%) felt that there is a 
better approach to capabilities.  Comments indicated that the DHS 
approach was skewed or inconsistent, dated back to civil defense days, 
lacked coordination, and was not reflective of tribal needs.  The current 
tribal approach varies focusing on response, mitigation, SWOT (strength, 
weakness, opportunity, threat) analysis or HSEEP (Homeland Security 
Exercise Evaluation Program) guidelines.  Tribal respondents suggested 
that more of a regional approach involving trained state subject matter 
experts might be more beneficial. 
• Clarity – respondents indicated that they understood the DHS capabilities 
approach.  Only one-half (50%) indicated that they understood the 
interdependencies between the TCL and UTL.  Comments indicated that 
the DHS capabilities element conflicted with other federal agency 
requirements.  The interdependency element understanding is questionable 
as comments reflected non-related concerns: vulnerable sites, remoteness, 
and financial resources. 
• Collaboration – responses indicated collaboration or consultation with 
tribal entities is non-existent and no comments are offered. 
• Value – respondents indicated they used the TCL and UTL elements, 67% 
and 50% respectively.  Comments, however, indicated the use was only as 
a guide based on grant driven requirements lacking a connection with 
sovereignty issues.  The basis for the tribal implementation was founded 
on the direction received from their elders.  
The tribal chart indicates that respondents chose more terrorism related issues as 
their primary focus.  The six respondents identified 39 scenarios pertinent to their 
respective jurisdictions.  While the terrorism scenarios account for almost two-thirds of 
the available choices in the survey, terrorism events accounted for 61.5% of the 
selections.  The non-terrorism related scenarios accounted for 38.5% of the selections.  
The chart identifies Radiological Attack, Explosive Attack, Cyber Attack, Wild land Fire 
and Winter Storm as the top five choices; two of the five being non-terrorism related.  If  
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DHS were to have chosen the top 15 scenarios most likely of concern to tribal 
jurisdictions, the list in ranked order would appear as follows (** indicates scenario as 
one of the 15 DHS scenarios): 
• Winter Storm        67% 
• Radiological Attack - Radiological Dispersal Device**  50% 
• Explosive Attack - Improvised Explosive Device**   50% 
• Cyber Attack**       50% 
• Wild land Fire        50% 
• Improvised Nuclear Device**     33% 
• Biological Disease Outbreak - Pandemic Influenza**  33% 
• Chemical Attack - Chlorine Tank Explosion**   33% 
• Major Earthquake**       33% 
• Biological Attack - Food Contamination**    33% 
• Dam Failure        33% 
• Tornado        33% 
• Other         33% 
(Other included high winds, hazmat, civil unrest, and bridge collapse.) 
• Biologic Attack - Aerosol Anthrax**     17% 
• Biological Attack – Plague**      17% 
Tribal results identified 10 events (denoted by: **) that are part of original DHS 
15 scripted scenarios for the capabilities initiative. 
7. Aggregate Results 
The number of respondents submitting a survey totaled 185.  Their years of 








Table 7.   Aggregate Respondents Years of Experience in Emergency Management or 
Homeland Security 
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE                          # RESPONDENTS           % OF TOTAL 
0-6 46 25% 
6-11 42 23% 
11-16 24 13% 
16-21 30 16% 
22 & above 43 23% 
 
The aggregate survey results (local, state/territorial and tribal) are depicted in the 
following table.  The comment section has been deleted as their influence is captured in 
the Summary section.  The table structure is focused on organizing the questions and 
their respective response rates as they pertained to the four critical areas of concentration: 
understandable approach, initiative clarity, value to the discipline and level of 
collaboration.  The table is sorted by area of concentration referencing the applicable 
question. 
Table 8.   Aggregate Survey Results (with no comments) 
AGGREGATE SURVEY RESULTS (with No Comments) 
QUESTION # 
SURVEY 
QUESTION AVERAGE  CONCENTRATION LOCAL STATE/TERR. TRIBAL 
    POS NEG   POS NEG POS NEG POS NEG 
2 
















the comment box 
below     
APPROACH 
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AGGREGATE SURVEY RESULTS (with No Comments) 
QUESTION # 
SURVEY 
QUESTION AVERAGE  CONCENTRATION LOCAL STATE/TERR. TRIBAL 
    POS NEG   POS NEG POS NEG POS NEG 
8 
Do you feel there 






60% 40% 58% 42% 67% 33% 
12 





capabilities?     
APPROACH 



















and the Universal 
Task List? 69% 31%
CLARITY 
66% 34% 75% 25% 50% 50% 
10 
Were you a 










4% 96% 12% 88% 0% 100% 
11 
Were you 






15% 85% 23% 77% 0% 100% 
3 
Does your agency 
use the Target 
Capabilities List 
to identify the 
capabilities it 
needs to develop? 63% 37%
VALUE 
57% 43% 74% 26% 67% 33% 
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AGGREGATE SURVEY RESULTS (with No Comments) 
QUESTION # 
SURVEY 
QUESTION AVERAGE  CONCENTRATION LOCAL STATE/TERR. TRIBAL 
    POS NEG   POS NEG POS NEG POS NEG 
4 
Does your agency 
use the Universal 
Task List to 
identify the tasks 






48% 52% 53% 47% 50% 50% 
7 
Please explain 
why your agency 
uses the approach 
described in 
number 6 in the 
comment box 
below     
VALUE 
            
 
The following chart depicts the aggregate of the applicable scenarios identified by 
all survey respondents with respect to their jurisdictional hazards and threats.  The chart 
identifies the scenarios listed in the survey and captures the composite number of 
respondents that chose each scenario. 
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8. Aggregate Analysis 
The respondents represented each categorical level of experience.  Only 25% of 
all the respondents were new to the discipline after 9/11.  The majority of the 
respondents, 75%, were members of their profession at the time of 9/11 or before.  Over 
one-half of the respondents, 52%, have 11 or more years of experience.  The respondents 
represented a good cross section of experience levels for the survey with a significant 
portion being seasoned professionals.  Respondents did not overwhelmingly agree with 
the initiative.  The survey captured very few positive comments, however, the vast 
majority were not complimentary indicating there was a better way to achieve a positive 
outcome that was relevant to the respondents.  The information captured and categorized 
by area of concentration is as follows: 
• Approach – survey results indicate that there is an understanding of the 
DHS capabilities approach.  The results also indicate that over one-half of 
the respondents feel there is a better approach.  Comments from each 
section indicate the respondents may understand the initiative, but they do 
not necessarily agree with the approach.  The approach needs to be more 
jurisdictional focused on needs and hazards that are applicable.  
• Clarity - the survey results indicate that the capabilities and the 
interdependencies are not universally clear to the respondents.  
Respondents indicate they understand the elements, but comments indicate 
they are “too cumbersome” and “convoluted” and there understanding is 
described by ambiguous terms. 
• Collaboration – whether analyzed individual or on an aggregate basis, the 
DHS development exercised almost no collaboration and minimal 
consultation with affected stakeholders.  Respondents indicated that DHS 
virtually disregarded whatever collaboration or consultation occurred in 
the development process and the implementation was approached poorly. 
• Value – the survey results indicate that approximately one-half of the 
respondents see value in the DHS capability elements.  The comments, 
however, establish the value as a guide and not an accepted practice. 
The chart section indicates that respondents find non-terrorism related scenarios 
to be more prominent for their jurisdictions.  The 185 respondents identified 1553 
scenarios pertinent to their respective jurisdictions.  While the terrorism scenarios 
account for almost two-thirds of the available choices in the survey, terrorism events only 
accounted for 56.1% of the selections.  The non-terrorism related scenarios accounted for 
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43.9% of the selections.  As in the local and state/territorial results, the chart identifies 
Pandemic Influenza, Wild land Fire, Flood, Winter Storm, and Tornado as the top five 
choices.  If DHS were to have chosen the top 15 scenarios most likely of concern to all 
jurisdictions, the list in ranked order would appear as follows (** indicates scenario as 
one of the 15 DHS scenarios): 
• Flood        79% 
• Winter Storm       75% 
• Biological Disease Outbreak - Pandemic Influenza** 58% 
• Wild land Fire       55% 
• Tornado       51% 
• Explosive Attack - Improvised Explosive Device**  45% 
• Cyber Attack**      42% 
• Chemical Attack - Chlorine Tank Explosion**  42% 
• Major Earthquake**      41% 
• Dam Failure       37% 
• Chemical Attack - Toxic Industrial Chemicals**  35% 
• Major Hurricane**      35% 
• Biological Attack - Food Contamination**   34% 
• Biological Attack - Foreign Animal Disease**  30% 
• Other        29% 
As in the local or state/territorial results, the aggregate choices include 9 of 
original DHS 15 scripted scenarios for the capabilities initiative. 
The following table summarizes a comparison of the scenarios chosen by survey 
respondents sorted by order of importance to the jurisdiction (most important to least 






Table 9.   Summary of Respondents Chosen Scenarios by Order of Importance 
Summary of Respondents Chosen Scenarios by Order of Importance 
AGGREGATE LOCAL STATE/TERRITORIAL TRIBAL 
Flood  Flood Flood Winter Storm 
Winter Storm Winter Storm Winter Storm Radiological Dispersal 
Device 
Pandemic Influenza Pandemic Influenza Pandemic Influenza Explosive Device 
Wild land Fire  Wild land Fire Wild land Fire Cyber Attack 
Tornado Tornado Tornado Wild land Fire 
Explosive Device Explosive Device Cyber Attack Nuclear Device 
Cyber Attack Chlorine Tank 
Explosion 
Explosive Device Pandemic Influenza 
Chlorine Tank 
Explosion 
Earthquake Chlorine Tank Explosion Chlorine Tank 
Explosion 
Earthquake Cyber Attack Dam Failure Earthquake 
Dam Failure Toxic Industrial Chem. Earthquake Food Contamination 
Toxic Industrial Chem. Dam Failure Hurricane Dam Failure 
Hurricane Hurricane Food Contamination Tornado 
Food Contamination
  
Food Contamination Toxic Industrial Chem. Other 
Foreign Animal Disease Foreign Animal 
Disease 
Foreign Animal Disease Aerosol Anthrax 
Other Other Other Plague 
 
The scenarios chosen by the various jurisdictions are very similar to the aggregate 
results.  The local and state/territorial top five scenario choices match the aggregate 
summary.  The remainder of the 15 local or state/territorial scenarios matches the 
aggregate summary, but is prioritized in a different manner.  The tribal choices include 11 
of the 15 scenarios found in the aggregate summary and are prioritized in a different 
manner.  The prioritization differences are most likely jurisdiction dependent or 
potentially due to geographical location.  The comparison validates the fact that the 
majority of the jurisdictions find non-terrorism related events to be of a higher priority 
than terrorism specific occurrences. 
C. SUMMARY 
Respondents understand the DHS Target Capabilities initiative, but they do not 
agree that it is the most appropriate to achieve the intended outcome.  Many respondents 
indicate that the initiative is too federally focused and the outcomes or requirements are 
inappropriately grant dependent.  Respondents agree that the Target Capabilities initiative 
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is a good guiding tool, however, the multitude of tasks and the design make it overly 
complex and cumbersome.  They agree that some type of system is necessary; however, it 
must be simple, realistic, consistent, and make sense in accord with jurisdictional 
concerns.  The survey participants call for an initiative that has a functional systems 
approach that is all-hazard in nature and not terrorism centric.  The jurisdictions tend to 
use a variety of approaches, however, the common basis for the jurisdictional concerns 
target an approach centered on the known threats and hazard vulnerabilities.  Survey 
participants indicate that the initiative development needs to be scalable to account for 
jurisdictional differences and completed in a collaborative grass roots approach among 
the stakeholders with national discussion.  The survey suggests that the resultant initiative 
outcome needs to be mission based.  The criticality to fulfilling the mission is defining 
the gaps and targeting the necessary resources to satisfy the need. 
The information obtained from the survey and analysis of the current capabilities 
initiative is used to develop an enhanced framework.  The next chapter discusses the new 
proposed framework in detail. 
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IV. CREATING AN IMPROVED CAPABILITIES FRAMEWORK 
This chapter explains the creation of an improved capabilities framework.  
Explaining the improvements to a currently developed system or project requires a 
logical approach.  While deciding on how to approach the explanation, I reflected on a 
situation that occurred during my college days.  A close friend was extremely gifted and 
talented in the auto mechanic and auto body disciplines.  He decided that he wanted to 
transform an old vehicle into a street rod.  Jim went through quite a process to achieve the 
intended result.  Based on his knowledge, expertise, and research, he conducted an 
analysis of his project car.  Jim considered the internal and external factors affecting the 
project car performance.  Elements he considered included the size of the current engine, 
air dynamics and industry developed performance reports.  He then proceeded to look at 
alternative approaches that could be implemented to direct the transformation toward the 
intended result.  Jim looked at different engines and their horsepower ratings exhaust 
systems, cooling systems, front-end suspension possibilities, and rear end gear ratios and 
integrating a nitrous oxide boosting system.  After determining the methods or approach 
that worked best, he developed the framework for the vehicle that complemented the 
design elements chosen for the new vehicle.  His framework ended up being an 
aluminum frame with restructured motor mounts, realigned suspension mounts and a 
shortened rearward reach to accommodate the chopped body.  Jim performed a dry run 
test of the components with the new framework design among subject matter experts to 
ensure the intended outcome and functionality existed.  After the testing was complete, 
Jim decided on the foundation that would move the vehicle to its top performance.  This 
step consisted of determining the type of wheels, tires, tire pattern, tire width, and height 
to complement achieving the outcome.  Finally, Jim considered the pros and cons of his 
new development toward achieving optimum performance in an effort to determine any 
final adjustments.  He concluded that there were no necessary adjustments and this gifted 




his efforts was realized in the performance record on the show circuit.  Jim’s old project 
car turned into a 21st century dream machine receiving many grand champion 
designations and a feature as the car of the month in the Hot Rod magazine.   
The development of the improved Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
capabilities framework is, perhaps, the most critical element of this thesis to understand.  
The following explanation will mirror the logical approach used by Jim in building his 
award-winning hot rod.  The components of the explanation will include several 
elements: analysis, alternate approaches, framework design, system testing, foundation 
development, considering pros and cons of the approach, performance measurement, and 
a conclusion.  Comments within some sections of the analysis are based on my 17 years 
of experience in the emergency management field working directly with these 
components as a planner or overseeing the development as the agency administrator.  The 
first element considered is the following analysis component.  The component is 
considered in two parts: internal and external elements. 
A. ANALYSIS – INTERNAL SYSTEM 
The internal analysis considers the Chapter II research and a review of two target 
capabilities.  The analysis in Chapter II indicates that there are many incongruities among 
the federal directives guiding the development of the current DHS target capabilities 
initiative.  The incongruities point to a lack of consistency, collaboration, and 
coordination.  The development of the current approach was framed through 
consultations.  According to Dr. Sharon Caudle, the DHS consultations with state and 
local partners are the downfall of the initiative as a replacement for true collaboration.  In 
fact, several consultative efforts exist that are duplicative in nature given the fact they 
cover the same issues.  The entire effort does not provide for any consistency toward 
achieving the intended outcome. 
Further internal analysis considered two capabilities of interest to the author: 
communications and evacuation.  The analysis raised additional concerns with regard to 
consistency and coordinated integration.  The following exemplifies the incongruities 
residing within the capabilities. 
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• Communications Capability Analysis 
• The outcome and the definition for this capability are not 
synchronous.  The DHS Target Capabilities List (TCL) establishes 
the outcome as continuous flow of critical information.  This flow 
must be maintained as needed among multi-jurisdictional and 
multidisciplinary emergency responders, command posts, agencies, 
and the governmental officials for the duration of the emergency 
response operation in compliance with National Incident 
Management System (NIMS)  The capability definition refines this 
element to wireless communications for exchanging voice and 
data.43  This exchange is indeed multi-jurisdictional, but limited to 
mainly emergency responders and not as globally implemented, as 
the outcome would lead one to believe is necessary for this 
capability. 
• The TCL framework lists seven activities for this capability.  Four 
of these elements raise red flags as being counter to the outcome, 
capability definition, and standard practices. 
• Provide Incident Command/First Responder/First 
Receiver/Interoperable Communications - Definition: In 
response to notification of an incident, go to the scene to 
provide and receive interoperable voice data and video 
communications. 
• Provide Emergency Operations Center Communications 
Support 
• Provide Federal Facilities, Task Force, and Recovery 
Assistance Interoperable Communications. 
• Return to Normal Operations - Definition: Initiate 
deactivation procedures for the interoperable 
communications system and return the system to a ready 
state.44 
First, the wireless communication system is supposed to be developed to receive 
voice and data so responders can communicate regardless of their location.  They do not 
have to report to the incident scene achieve this result.  Secondly, providing Emergency 
Operations Center, federal facility, task force and recovery interoperable communications 
support is not generally done through the wireless radio voice and data medium.  Finally, 
                                                 
43 Department of Homeland Security, Target Capabilities List – A Companion to the National 
Preparedness Goal (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006), 
https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/nlsearch/NLResult.cfm?nextrec=1&page=1&CFID=6316935&CF
TOKEN=65374843 (accessed June 14, 2007), 90. 
44 Ibid., 90 – 97. 
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deactivating the system and returning to a ready state is totally out of context.  Wireless 
voice and date interoperable communication systems are in operation 24 hours a day and 
7 days a week to mirror first responder operational timeframes.  The prime example of 
this type of operation resides with the alert and dispatch function that is fully activated 
24/7 and 365 days a year to notify or deploy first responder agencies.  These comparisons 
illustrate the need to look closely at the integration of internal elements, as they are not 
clearly aligned with this capabilities’ intended outcome. 
• The TCL considers communications as a common capability.  This 
capability is clearly not global in nature under the current structure 
as it refers to only wireless communications among and between 
response agencies and only in context to the response mission area.  
Communications are also required between various levels of 
government and between agencies that do not use a radio centric 
wireless system as their primary or secondary means of contact.  
• This capability is constructed for a given mission area: response.  
The premise of this capability is further confused by the fact that it 
is response oriented and includes an activity for the recovery 
mission area. 
• The critical tasks for each activity further confuse the issue as 
some are procedural in nature and not part of the first responder 
responsibility or are simply protocols that need to be followed: 
“Request external resources using EMAC and other mutual 
aid/assistance processes (inter- and intra-state)……  Use 
established common response communications language (i.e., plain 
English).”45  The Emergency Management Assistance Compact 
(EMAC) is a process that is used in the Emergency Operations 
Center and using “clear text” is a protocol. 
• Evacuation Capability Analysis 
• The current DHS TCL indicates that “Evacuation and Shelter-in-
Place” is a response mission area element.  The DHS TCL 
establishes the outcome as “affected and at-risk populations (and 
companion animals) are safely sheltered-in-place and/or evacuated 
to safe refuge areas, in order to obtain access to medical care, 
physical assistance, shelter, and other essential services, and 
effectively and safely reentered into the affected area, if  
 
                                                 
45 Department of Homeland Security, Target Capabilities List – A Companion to the National 
Preparedness Goal, 93 – 95. 
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appropriate.”46  The capability definition matches the outcome 
statement almost word for word with the exception that it leaves 
out the essential needs element. 
• This capability relates only to the response mission area.  The 
outcome, however, could potentially be applied in a prevention 
mission area if an explosive device was suspected and the need 
existed to evacuate the area. 
• The capability nomenclature is misleading.  Evacuation is 
relatively simple through an alert and notification system-
requesting residents to leave the affected area.  The outcome is 
much more comprehensive than the nomenclature leads one to 
believe because issues such as sheltering and mass care are 
included. 
• The outline of this capability lists several activities.  The activities, 
however, are misplaced or duplicative further confusing the 
validity of their applicability.  First, the activities include global 
elements (planning, training and exercising) that are foundation 
elements to the entire system of capabilities.  Secondly, once the 
evacuation and shelter-in-place component is activated, the 
implementation of procedures that is listed separately should be 
automatic once the primary component is activated.  Thirdly, 
operation of an evacuation and staging area includes managing 
evacuees, yet these elements, for unspecified reasons, are listed as 
two separate activities. 
• The critical tasks for each activity further confuse the issue as 
some are duplicative in nature and ones that are more prominent 
are not even mentioned.  Duplication is evident as voluntary 
tracking is invoked under the implementation activity and then 
shows up again to be provided under the operation staging area 
activity.  Implementing activities and corresponding procedures 
provide the mechanisms to achieve appropriate activation of the 
element and should not require a separate critical task. 
• The animal evacuation component is a primary parallel to the 
general population evacuation.  Even though animal considerations 
are accounted for in the planning activity, there is no mention 
under any of the other activities or critical tasks regarding this 
element.47 
                                                 
46 Department of Homeland Security, Target Capabilities List – A Companion to the National 
Preparedness Goal, 438. 
47 Ibid., 438 – 447. 
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• The DHS TCL framework lists eleven activities for the respective 
“Evacuation” capability. 
• Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and 
Systems 
• Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs 
• Direct Evacuation and/or In-Place Protection Tactical 
Operations 
• Activate Evacuation and/or In-Place Protection 
• Implement Evacuation Orders for General Population 
• Collect and Evacuate Population Requiring Assistance 
• Operate Evacuation Staging/Reception Area 
• Manage Incoming Evacuees 
• Implement In-Place Protection Procedures 
• Assist Re-Entry 
• Demobilize Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-In-Place 
Operations.48 
The organizational and relational structure of activities is questionable as to 
whether or not it follows a logical integrated approach.  Activate evacuation and/or in-
place protection is the parent strategy that should include the tasks: implement evacuation 
orders, direct the evacuation, collect, and evacuate populations requiring assistance and 
implement in-place protection procedures.  According to the core outcome or definition, 
sheltering is a main component.  Operating evacuation staging/reception area, managing 
evacuees and demobilization are all procedural activities that are part of the sheltering 
element, not evacuation. 
The incongruities identified in the communication and evacuation capabilities 
provide insight that an organized logical approach or design to developing a given 
capability is necessary to ensure complete coordination and integration of all system 
elements.  These elements must be considered along with external factors or information.  
The next section will highlight external considerations to complete the analysis picture.   
B. ANALYSIS - EXTERNAL 
Important to the development of this initiative is the consideration or analysis of 
any external information that can be utilized from the industry.  As referenced in Chapter 
                                                 
48 Department of Homeland Security, Target Capabilities List – A Companion to the National 
Preparedness Goal, 438 – 447. 
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III, a nationwide survey within the emergency management community was conducted to 
ascertain that community’s perspective regarding the DHS TCL effort.  The survey 
analysis indicates that jurisdictions are in favor of guidance creating a simple, realistic, 
and consistent system based on jurisdictional concerns.  The system development must be 
a collaborative grass roots effort inclusive of a national perspective.  The approach focus 
must be all-hazard in nature centered on the jurisdictional risks and threats.  The 
jurisdictions favor a functional systems approach that is scalable, mission based, includes 
gap identification, and targets the resources necessary to satisfy the need.  These elements 
define the stakeholder’s preferred outcome with respect to target capabilities 
development.  The next section will discover other pertinent or alternative approaches 
that may provide insight toward the development of an improved framework. 
C. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
The literary review identified several methodologies to consider in developing the 
elements of an improved framework.  These methodologies include the current DHS 
Target Capabilities approach – Capabilities-Based-Planning (CBP), Effects-Based-
Planning (EBP) efforts, National Incident Management System (NIMS) parameters and 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Capability Assessment for 
Readiness (CAR) component.  The following sections will expand on each of these 
methodologies identifying the components that are applicable to developing an improved 
framework based on the preferred outcome established in the survey section. 
1. Capability-Based-Planning 
Current 2008 DHS efforts are focused on CBP methodology.  CBP is defined by 
Paul Davis as “planning, under uncertainty, to provide capabilities suitable for a wide 
range of modern-day challenges and circumstances while working within an economic 
framework that necessitates choice.”49  The application of CBP follows two approaches 
that have been developed and used by the Department of Defense (DOD) for war-fighting 
                                                 
49 Paul K. Davis, Analytical Architecture for Capability-Based Planning, Mission System Analysis, 
and Transformation (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1513, (accessed June 23, 2007), 7. 
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purposes.  The agency’s original approach is based on a requirements generated system.  
This development finds the various service components establishing requirements based 
on a set of scenarios.  The requirements identify systems that are integrated at the 
department level.  The DOD created a new approach that reversed the order of the 
original approach.  The basis of this approach involves integrating the capabilities at the 
beginning of the process by developing the vision first through a collaborative process 
involving all the stakeholders.  This approach is focused on outputs instead of inputs 
(tasks or requirements).  The output or vision approach is analogous to an effects based 
rather than system specific development method.  This mission or effects based approach 
was identified as a necessary element in the survey toward developing capabilities.  A 
diagram of the two approaches follows.50 
 
Diagram 1. Capability-Based Approach 
                                                 
50 Stephen K. Walker, Capabilities Based Planning – How it is Intended to Work and Challenges to Its 
Successful Implementation (Carlisle, PA: Government Printing Office, 2005), 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil239.pdf (accessed October 1, 2007), 11.  
  67
The left side of the diagram depicts DODs original approach to CBP.  This 
requirements based approach is analogous to the current CBP target capabilities 
development using 15 scenarios.  The right side of the diagram depicts DODs new effects 
based type approach to CBP.  The new approach is mission based or analogous to 
Effects-Based-Planning. 
The DHS effort follows the original DOD approach using specific requirements 
as the basis for development of capabilities.  A diagram of the DHS process is included 
below.51 
 




                                                 
51 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Target Capabilities List – A Companion to the National 
Preparedness Goal (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006), 
https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/nlsearch/NLResult.cfm?nextrec=1&page=1&CFID=6316935&CF
TOKEN=65374843, (accessed June 14, 2007), 14. 
  68
The DHS approach utilizes scenarios to develop mission area tasks.  The mission 
or functional areas are defined by the current system directives: response, recovery, 
protection, and prevention.  The focus is on the functional area.  The capabilities are the 
necessary components to perform the tasks.  The tasks are the thousands of elements 
identified in the Universal Task List (UTL) and are the foundation for the capability 
development.  This implementation approach is input (task or requirement) based and not 
necessarily, mission oriented.  The mission areas, however, did not generate any 
disagreement in the survey and will be incorporated into the improved framework design.  
2. Effects-Based-Planning 
Effects-Based-Planning (EBP) is a military approach under development that is 
worth consideration.  “The EBP methodology is outcome based instead of input oriented.  
Over the past decade EBP has been adopted as the name for a methodology in which the 
desired effect/outcome of any action, regardless of its scale, should be identified before 
that action is initiated, and which ideally should be complemented by its associated ways 
and mean.”52  “The objective is to realize an effect tailored to the prevailing 
circumstances.”53  The concept is noted as an ends-ways-means approach.  As noted 
above, the “ends” is establishing the outcome.  The “ways” are the strategies to achieve 
the end.  The “means” are the resources applied to the actions in an effort to achieve the 
strategy.  The means to the end need to exist in order to achieve the identified outcome.54 
The EBP process also suggests that effects or outcomes are agents of change and 
triggers to other causes or issues of concern.  Implementing certain actions will achieve 
the intended outcome considered as a first-order effect.  These actions, however, may 
have a cause-effect in another complimentary or unrelated area creating a second-order  
 
 
                                                 
52 Alan Stephens, “Strategy with Style – Effects Based Planning,” Strategic and Defense Centre 
Studies, 2, no. 1, (Canberra, Australia: Australian National University, 2006), 
http://rspas.anu.edu.au/papers/sdsc/analysis/Strategy_with_Style.pdf (accessed January 16, 2008), 1. 
53 Ibid., 3. 
54 Ibid., 6. 
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effect.  Likewise, the second-order effect may cause a third-order effect.  These effects 
are seen as interim objectives to achieving the final outcome or effect.55  The following 
diagram depicts the notion of first and second-order effects.56   
 
Diagram 3. First and Second-Order Effects 
The subsequent effects to an action can be seen as either complimentary or 
detrimental to the intended outcome.  Regardless of their impact, these order effects need 
to be considered before implementing the action to ensure the intended outcome is not 
compromised.  If the additional effects could be detrimental, adjustments should be 
considered among the actions or strategies to lessen the negative impact on the outcome.  
Adjustments may also be required after the second or third order effect(s) occur, as their 
detrimental consequences may not have been identifiable in the pre-development stages. 
The philosophy proposed by the EBP methodology parallels the survey analysis 
outcome identifying the need to concentrate on the mission.  The mission oriented 
approach keys on identifying the intended outcome first and then designing the 
subsequent steps to achieving the effect.  The EBP outcome based process and the 
corresponding ordered effects are elements for consideration in developing the improved 
framework because of the integrated cause and effect relationships.  These elements also 
speak to satisfying the mission-based concept identified in the survey. 
3. NIMS Considerations 
The Incident Command System (ICS) is the core component for directing the 
implementation of a system to manage any given incident.  The implementation of ICS is 
                                                 
55 Jay Kreighbaum, Force Application Planning: A Systems and Effects Based Approach (Maxwell Air 
Force Base, AL: Government Printing Office, 1998), www.au.af.mil/au/awc//awcgate/saas/kreighbaum.pdf, 
(accessed January 16, 2008), 39. 
56 Ibid., 40. 
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founded on a scalable management structure highlighting multi-agency coordination.  
The incident(s) are approached by identifying objectives, strategies, and tactics to 
manage the event.  Incident objectives are defined as “Statements of guidance and 
direction necessary for the selection of appropriate strategy(s), and the tactical direction 
of resources.  Incident objectives are based on realistic expectations of what can be 
accomplished when all allocated resources have been effectively deployed.”57  This 
system is another example of an output-based approach defining the expected outcome or 
objective at the onset.  The strategies to accomplish the outcomes are developed second.  
Finally, the tactics or actions are decided upon to achieve the strategies cognizant of the 
available resources.  If the resources are available to complete the tactical actions, the 
implementation is deemed capable of completing the strategy.  ICS integrates one more 
distinction regarding the proposed strategy: “Air Operations is responsible for 
implementing its strategic aspects--those that relate to the overall incident strategy as 
opposed to those that pertain to tactical operations (specific target selection).”58  The 
distinction raised here is between strategic initiatives that are global in nature and those 
that are more specifically oriented to incident specific operational or tactical components.  
The interpretation is that the mission is supported by global or more specific operational 
outcomes.  Since NIMS is required, a core component of Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 5 (HSPD 5) and complementary to the National Preparedness Goal (NPG), it 
seems prudent to incorporate this current doctrine element into the enhanced framework.  
Theses elements have already proven themselves through years of successful 
implementation in the fire response community.  Their consideration for the improved 
framework can only benefit system integration and enhance the logical approach that the 
strategies support: global or operational outcomes. 
                                                 
57 California Office of Emergency Services, Firescope California – Glossary of Terms (Riverside, 
CA: Government Printing Office, 1999), http://www.firescope.org/ics-guides-terminology.htm, (accessed 
June 26, 2007), 12. 
58 California Office of Emergency Services, Firescope – Field Operations Guide ICS 420-1 
(Riverside, CA: Government Printing Office, 2007), http://www.firescope.org/ics-8x11-fog.htm, (accessed 
June 25, 2007), 34. 
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4. Capability Assessment for Readiness 
Many survey respondents indicated they used the Capability Assessment for 
Readiness (CAR) as their guiding tool.  “NEMA, FEMA, and the International 
Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM) have developed a draft Local CAR because 
of the popularity of the State CAR.”59  The purpose of the instrument design allowed 
states to determine the effectiveness of their operational program readiness and identify 
the gaps.  The methodology is based on 13 Emergency Management Functions (EMF): 
“Laws and Authorities; Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment; Hazard Mitigation; 
Resource Management; Planning; Direction, Control and Coordination; Communications 
and Warning; Operations and Procedures; Logistics and Facilities; Training; Exercises, 
Evaluations, and Corrective Actions; Crisis Communications and Public 
Education/Information and Finance/Administration.”60  Several attributes accompanied 
each EMF and the assessment of effectiveness is founded on the capability to execute.  
The EMF analysis determines whether the jurisdiction is “Fully Capable, Very Capable, 
Generally Capable, Marginally Capable or Not Capable” of implementing the 
corresponding attributes.61  The final analysis involves considering the need for each 
attribute with respect to the hazards identified in the jurisdiction to determine the absolute 
capability requirements.  The CAR became the instrument to establish nationwide 
standards in the emergency management field.  The work done with the CAR resulted in 
the creation of the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP).  The 
application of the hazards identified by the jurisdiction, gap identification and the 
implementation process is the take-away from a methodology that was commented on in 
the survey and worthy of inclusion.  The respondents indicated that the foundation 
needed to be based on, not terrorism centric scenarios, but on the hazards faced in their 
jurisdictions and the gaps in accomplishing the mission. 
                                                 
59 Federal Emergency Management Agency, A Report to the US Senate Committee on Appropriations 
– State Capability Assessment for Readiness (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2001), 123. 
60 Ibid., 2. 
61 Ibid., 3. 
  72
With the analysis and alternate approaches identified, the next logical step is to 
sculpt the improved framework design.  The design considers the applicable components 
in relation to the intended outcome.  The next section outlines the framework design that 
accommodates the applicable elements identified in the survey and research as necessary 
components to improving the current DHS capabilities framework. 
D. IMPROVED FRAMEWORK DESIGN PROPOSAL 
After 9/11, a heightened sense of anxiety existed to “do something” to counteract 
one of the most horrific experiences the United States had ever witnessed.  First, DHS is 
to be commended for their efforts to put in place a system meeting the intent of a 
directive and congressional concerns in a relatively short timeframe.  The President 
signed Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD 8) on December 17, 2003.  A 
short 15 months later, March of 2005, the interim guidance was released establishing the 
“national system” to include the National Preparedness Goal, Universal Task List, and 
Target Capabilities List components.  Appendix A contains a timeline based on major 
milestones for Federal Fiscal Year 05.62  Appendix B contains a timeline based on the 
key milestones for the same year.63  These timelines are a good reference to establish an 
understanding of the development pressure DHS faced.  As expressed in the guidance 
document, “It is animated by a sense of urgency.”64  The research and development of 
this thesis to “Improve the Current DHS Capabilities Framework” had the luxury of 18 
months plus the advantage of years of experience to study all the elements in formulating 
an improved design.  The following proposed framework design is the result of those 
efforts. 
                                                 
62 Department of Homeland Security, HSPD 8 Major Milestones (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 2004). 
63 Department of Homeland Security, HSPD 8 Key Milestones (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 2005).  
64 Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Guidance – Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 8 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/assessments/hspd8.htm (accessed June 8, 2007), iii. 
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1. Design Methodology 
The research indicates several incongruities exist causing concern over the current 
initiative.  The thesis survey analysis in Chapter III indicates that the current initiative is a 
good guiding tool, however, there are several elements identified in the survey that are 
not part of the current CBP effort that should be part of improving capability 
development.  In lieu of this fact, the proposed design for the enhanced framework is a 
hybrid of the current initiative and the other alternate approaches identified above to 
satisfy the identified needs. 
In order to develop any type of framework, the principle definition for the 
initiative must be clearly understood.  DHS uses the following to define the term 
“Capabilities:” “A capability provides the means to achieve a measurable outcome 
resulting from the performance of one or more critical tasks, under specified conditions 
and performance standards.”65  Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines “Capability” as 
the “Quality of being capable, capacity…a feature, condition.”66  The Webster definition 
speaks to having the means or resources to do something.  That is to say, are you capable 
of, do you have the capacity to or are the conditions in place to achieve the intended 
outcome?  I will first submit that the DHS use of “Capabilities” is out of context and 
what should be the result is a list of outcomes or effects that is designed to compliment 
the strategic global efforts and the mission area specific needs. 
Intuitively Webster’s definition leads to designing an EBP approach and the 
principle component is the outcome, not a Target Capability.  According to the NIMS 
methodology, ICS indicates that outcomes are either global or operational in nature.  
Based on the EBP and NIMS premise, the framework should be designed around 
categorized Target Outcomes (TOs).  Based on the Webster definition, EBP philosophy 
and the NIMS elements, the following Target Outcome definition will be used for the 
development of the improved framework: 
                                                 
65 Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Goal (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 2005), https://www.llis.gov, (accessed June 12, 2007), 17. 
66 Merriam Webster, Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary – Fifth Edition (Springfield, MA: G. & C. 
Merriam Co., 1946), 705. 
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• Target Outcome – Strategic effects or outcomes applied in an all-hazard 
context that are either global or operational in nature and designed to 
achieve the intended outcome in support of the mission. 
The following framework section will describe the necessary design elements 
toward achieving an EBP outcome based result. 
2. The Framework 
Standard planning development parameters are used to define a logical approach 
for the improved framework.  The integration of the featured components will be the 
foundation for the success of the improved framework.  The outcome approach is a 
derivative of the EBP methodology.  The mission area functionality is a component of the 
current DHS TCL effort.  The Mission Areas (prevent, protect, respond and recover) are 
part of the current initiative and accepted nationally and will be used to organize the 
outcomes.  The strategic aspects of global or operational outcomes are pulled from the 
NIMS ICS doctrine.  The hazard or threat application and gap identification is an 
outgrowth of the CAR initiative.  The following outlines the enhanced framework design.  
A graphic depiction of the layout is also provided. 
a. Framework Components 
• Mission – Achieve a heightened level of readiness by improving the 
attainment of the Target Outcomes through effective planning, training 
and exercising.  The mission statement is founded on being prepared.  
Preparedness is achieved through the main elements of planning, training, 
exercising and providing the necessary resources to ensure all outcomes 
are effectively actionable and coordinated.  These elements are an 
important component of the enhanced framework’s foundation. 
• Goal - Develop Target Outcomes (strategic effects or outcomes that are 
either global or operational) through a grass roots collaborative effort that 
will improve the readiness of federal, state, local, tribal and territorial 
jurisdictions involved in being prepared to prevent, protect against, 
respond to and recover from any hazard.  The intention is to develop the 
resultant TOs in a well-orchestrated grass roots effort to achieve 
comprehensive inclusion of all the affected stakeholders. 
• Task One - Develop the strategic global target outcomes that are common 
to all mission areas: prevent, protect, respond, and recover.  The global or 
strategic outcomes are those effects that are applicable to all mission areas 
and most likely to occur regardless of the incident.  Some examples of 
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global outcomes might include multi-agency information sharing, 
logistics, finance, or public information.  These are global TOs that occur 
regardless of which mission area is active, the incident that occurs, or the 
level of government involved.  The TOs identified here are those that 
should be part of each stakeholder’s tool kit and developed as part of a 
national system to improve integration, coordination and reduce 
duplication of benefit.  These are only suggested areas of consideration 
based on the writer’s 17 years of experience in emergency management; 
however, they will need to be validated through the grass roots approach.  
It is important to identify any second or third order effects that may be 
outcome implementation derivatives.  The development of the TOs will 
need to account for these effects and be adjusted accordingly.  The 
adjustments will ensure the intended mission and other affected areas are 
not adversely impacted. 
• Task Two - Develop the strategic operational target outcomes specific to 
the respective mission area(s).  The operational outcomes are those effects 
that may need to implemented in support of one or more mission areas, but 
not applicable to all and dependent on the incident requirements.  A TO 
(such as population relocation) may be required as a prevention technique 
or a response to an incident; and, not applicable under the recovery 
mission area.  It is important to identify any second or third order effects 
that may be outcome implementation derivatives.  The development of the 
TOs will need to account for these effects and be adjusted accordingly.  
The adjustments will ensure the intended mission and other affected areas 
are not adversely impacted. 
• Task Three – Identify the elements necessary to achieve each of the 
strategic global or operational TOs.  This task involves identifying the 
elements or operational components that must be activated to achieve the 
intended outcome.  One element that could be activated to achieve several 
outcomes may be the need for mass transportation. 
• Task Four - Develop the relevancy of the operational outcomes per 
jurisdiction in relation to their respective hazards and threats.  This task 
entails a process similar to that exercised in the CAR initiative.  During 
the development under this strategy, the jurisdiction(s) apply their 
respective hazards or threats.  This application allows the jurisdiction to 
determine if the TO is applicable and if so, what adjustments need to be 
integrated into the design to meet their needs. 
• Task Five - Identify the gaps impeding the global and operational 
outcomes from being realized and produce a composite roll-up.  At this 
point, the capacity or capability to implement the relevant TOs is assessed 
in comparison to the available resources.  This process is similar to the 
approach exercised in the CAR development.  The result identifies the 
gaps or breakpoints that will prevent the jurisdiction from implementing 
the respective TO effectively.  These gaps in resources can then be rolled 
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up into a composite national report by jurisdiction, state, or region.  This 
roll-up information will be critical for implementing adjustments or 
alternatives to facilitate implementing the TO effectively as outlined in the 
next strategy. 
• Task Six – Prioritize the gaps and outcomes in order to establish 
completion deadlines.  This strategy is perhaps the most difficult.  Based 
on the criticality of the deficient outcomes and the magnitude of the 
corresponding gaps, prioritization occurs creating an approach mechanism 
for curing the deficiencies.  The development could be done exclusively at 
a specified level of government (local, state, tribal, territorial, regional, 
national) or a combination of any one or all levels of engagement.  The 
prioritization, of course, is dependent on available funding and other 
available resources to complete the development.  This stage provides a 
reality check as some TOs may not be attainable. 
• Task Seven – Assess the TOs.  This task engages in the assessment of 
those TOs seen as unrealistic or unachievable.  The value of the 
assessment is to determine if the outcome is necessary and if so, work is 
commenced in priority order to find a solution or develop alternative 
approaches. 
The specifics and approach for each area enumerated above will need to be 
collaboratively developed among all the stakeholders.  This effort is critical to reducing 
incongruities and disconnects in the final product and its implementation.  The value 
added or unpredicted benefit of this development approach will be realized in the 
implementation phase.  Realistically, the development approach should maximize 
acceptance and agreement by all stakeholders and minimize any impeding factors toward 
developing target outcomes and corresponding elements. 
The following diagram depicts the enhanced framework and the corresponding 
elements outlined above.  The true foundation of this entire effort is the involvement of 
all stakeholders achieving preparedness through effective planning, training, and 
exercising of the identified target outcomes. 
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Diagram 4. EBP Target Outcomes 
b. Testing the Improved Framework 
The next step is to test the enhanced framework just as Jim did after he 
had completed the design and development of his hot rod project.  Testing in this case is 
perhaps, a bit more abstract since we are dealing with theory instead of an actual physical 
product.  Since we are dealing with improving the DHS TCL framework, it is prudent to 
test the enhanced framework using one of the current target capabilities.  The following 
evacuation capability application to the proposed framework, although not very inclusive, 
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attempts to apply the improved parameters to the evacuation scenario as a means of 
demonstrating its efficiencies meeting the outcomes derived from the survey.  The 
collaborative planning process will be critical for delineating all essential factors at the 
various developmental levels. 
• Mission – The foundation of the mission is being prepared.  The 
foundation elements incorporate the global aspects of planning, training, 
and exercising for each of the outcomes. 
• Goal – The collaborative process is yet to be designed, but it is the 
backbone for developing the global and operational outcomes in an all-
inclusive manner involving stakeholders from all levels of engagement.  
Chapter V provides some insight into the approach for developing such a 
collaborative effort. 
• Task One – Evacuation is not pertinent to this task, as it is not considered 
a global or strategic outcome. 
• Task Two – Evacuation is an operational outcome germane to the respond 
mission area or possibly prevention.  EBP is based on the outcome and 
evacuation itself is not the totality of the outcome that is the resultant.  
Reflecting on the TO definition suggested earlier, the nomenclature for 
this component could be more accurately cited as Population Relocation.  
The actual mission, effect, or outcome is to safely remove, relocate, care 
for, and provide re-entry assistance to the individuals and animals in an 
affected area.  Mass Care is a necessary element to the Population 
Relocation TO effort and would not need to be identified as a separate TO.  
Shelter-in-place is not included in this outcome, as it is perceived as a 
separate effect that will be implemented only in certain circumstances and 
requires its own development.  Second and third order effects need to be 
considered at this point to account for cause-effect impedance to other 
areas.   
• For example, the relocation effort may require the resources of the 
school bus system.  If school were in session, a second-order effect 
would be created causing the inability to transport students to 
school.  Consequently, a third-order effect regarding student 
attendance is realized potentially affecting the schools ability to 
receive grant funds based on pupil attendance days in a given year. 
• Task Three – The major elements to accomplish the outcome include, but 
are not limited to: 
• Implement evacuation of the affected area – this element will 
require resources that allow for proper alert/notification and 
transportation to the relocation sites for either individuals or 
animals. 
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• Activate relocation sites – this element will require resources to 
manage the site; perform evacuee intake and registration; provide 
short-term medical care; food, clothing, bedding, entertainment 
and essential amenities; facilities for animal care; decontamination 
ability; psychological and clergy services. 
• Transition individuals and animals to more permanent short-term 
living arrangements – this element will require tracking individuals 
or animals and engaging the resources of private industry, housing 
markets and other agency providers, such as Housing and Urban 
Development or FEMA, for living subsistence assistance.  
• Re-entry to affected area – this element will require the resources 
to monitor the area to ensure that re-entry is safe, contacting the 
evacuees to inform them of re-entry implementation and provide 
the necessary transportation. 
• Task Four – Relevancy - now, each jurisdiction applies their respective 
hazards and threats to the outcome to determine how the effect needs to be 
revised to accommodate jurisdictional issues.  It is also possible that the 
jurisdiction will determine the TO will never require implementation or a 
different alternative is acceptable. 
• Task Five – Once the applicable elements of the TO have been identified, 
the jurisdiction then completes an analysis of where the thresholds or gaps 
are in resources that will impede or prevent successful implementation of 
the outcome.  The jurisdiction applying the parameters of this TO may 
determine that they only have the resources to relocate a population of 
25,000 and not the required 150,000 borne by the elements of the disaster.   
• This step is critical to determining when outside assistance will be 
required and to what degree.  The results can then be rolled up into 
a composite picture to give planners the critical information 
needed to design overcoming threshold or resource impedance 
factors for all TOs on a jurisdictional, state, regional or national 
level.   
• Task Six – Prioritize the gaps and outcomes to establish completion 
deadlines in concert with available funding.   
• Task Seven – Assess the TO to determine whether or not it is even 
achievable based on budget availability and the time to complete 
development.  Depending on the available funding, the development may 
need to be done in a phased approach with alternative solutions identified 
until the elements of the TO are fully functional. 
It is difficult to complete a trial test of the enhanced framework without 
actually implementing the process.  For all intents and purposes, the testing or application 
of population relocation to the new framework, as described above, appears to make 
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sense and presents a more organized and logical approach toward developing TOs than 
the current TCL effort.  The design appears to enhance the coordination among the 
necessary components as more integration factors such as second and third order effects 
are considered.  The true testing will be validated through actually developing the TOs 
and implementing the process.  It is not apparent that the enhanced framework will be a 
success; however, it certainly integrates the components described by the stakeholders in 
the survey as the missing elements of the current DHS TCL effort. 
3. Foundation Elements 
Jim chose the most applicable tires to move his hot rod effectively based on the 
output of the design.  The collaboration among stakeholders and the preparedness 
(planning, training and exercising) components are deemed as the foundation elements.  
These elements were found in each of the current DHS framework capabilities instead of 
being highlighted as a global element.  Based on the design of the enhanced framework, 
these elements are not specific to any given TO; they are common components that apply 
to the entire framework.  These elements will be the wheels of motion, so to speak, to 
facilitate the successful development and implementation of the TOs.  One of the most 
prominent issues identified in the research and survey analysis is the lack of stakeholder 
inclusion.  The survey indicates that the inclusion in the current effort is seen as an after-
the-fact involvement mechanism.  It is clear, at least as observed in the survey responses, 
that inclusion in the development of the current DHS TCL was not exercised in 
partnership with the emergency management or homeland security community.  In order 
for the enhanced framework to be successful, the inclusion is identified as an integral part 
of the foundation involving all stakeholders.  Planning will be required to implement the 
foundation elements to ensure a certain degree of developmental coordination, 
acceptance, and consistency among jurisdictions. 
4. Pros and Cons 
The benefits of implementing the enhanced framework proposal are multi-faceted.  
The framework will provide a logical approach to the development.  This approach will 
provide for maximum coordination and integration of stakeholder input and the 
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development of the respective TOs.  Every project is likely to have some incongruities; 
however, maximizing the coordination and integration through a logical approach has the 
potential to minimize the existence of potential incongruities.  The design of the 
framework elements satisfies the areas of concern identified in the survey.  Incorporating 
the survey elements is a right step toward re-establishing credibility among all the 
partners in the emergency management community.  Following the enhanced framework, 
approach provides for the identification of critical gaps impeding successful TO 
development.  Such identification will allow developers to appropriately plan for resource 
allocation or alternate methods to achieve a successful outcome.  This element is not 
prevalent in the current DHS TCL approach and is viewed by the author of this thesis as 
one of the critical impeding factors to its successful implementation.  The real value 
added or unpredicted benefit to the enhanced framework is the grass roots development 
methodology.  This methodology will enhance the development of the partnership 
network forming stronger ties between jurisdictions and acceptance of the system they 
are engaged in developing.  Chapter V expands on this particular element. 
The drawbacks to implementing the enhanced framework will be the need to start 
from scratch integrating the new elements.  The redirection will require the allocation of 
new funds that will duplicate some of what has been spent under the current DHS effort.  
The design will benefit from the current TCLs that are applicable, but will require 
additional time to complete the new design causing the re-establishment of current 
proposed implementation timeframes.  The implementation of the enhanced framework 
will also cause additional work within the complementary National Response Framework 
(NRF), NIMS, EMAP, and directive elements to ensure appropriate collaboration, 
coordination, and integration.  The most prominent drawback will be the redirection of 
current DHS efforts and the retooling of guidance, policies, and program strategies.  
5. Performance Measurement 
Unlike Jim’s project hot rod, performance measurement of the enhanced 
framework will not be as readily ascertainable.  Much work will need to be done to 
complete the development.  The components of the development can be tracked to 
determine the level of capability to implement the measures.  Measuring the success of 
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the implementation, however, will occur over time as the TOs are actually implemented 
during real events.  The critical determiner in successful development will reside with the 
after-action analysis and implementation of corrective actions to improve the system. 
E. SUMMARY 
Even though many incongruities were identified among the major documents for 
the CBP effort, the framework development identified additional incongruities inherent in 
the initiative.  Other notable disconnects include listing elements such as “Mass Care” 
and “Firefighting” as TCLs when they are currently Emergency Support Functions in the 
current national plan.67  To confuse matters, Mass Care elements are also listed as a 
critical task under the Evacuation TCL, “Res B3a 8.3/8.4.”68  The real key is wading 
though all the confusion and duplication utilizing the pertinent information DHS has 
developed under the current TCL effort and integrating the elements of value into the 
new framework. 
The new framework meets the intent of the survey results providing an organized 
logical approach.  The construct is a grass roots effort that is mission based and 
formulated using an Effects-Based or outcome methodology.  The design appears to be 
simple and realistic integrating common planning elements, the tenants of ICS and the 
current CAR by allowing for the application of jurisdictional threats or hazards.  
Ultimately, the framework is built on the necessary effects or outputs applying the 
principles of an all-hazard context.  The new framework has the value added component 
of identifying gaps or thresholds and second or third order effects that will improve 
development accuracy and efficiencies to prevent implementation breakdown. 
The EBP approach has many merits to providing organizational efficiency toward 
the development of a national system cognizant of the interrelated components and 
                                                 
67 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 2008), http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf (accessed January 28, 1008), 
58. 
68 Department of Homeland Security, Target Capabilities List – A Companion to the National 
Preparedness Goal (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006), 
https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/nlsearch/NLResult.cfm?nextrec=1&page=1&CFID=6316935&CF
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jurisdictional needs.  The “output” based approach allows development to be guided 
toward success employing identified “ways” and “means” that are interrelated.  The 
current TCL CBP “input” based approach does not lead to the desired “end.”  CBP inputs 
lack clarity, inherent duplication causes confusion and the results or “ways” and “means” 
are not clearly identified.  “Establishing a logical and realistic relationship between the 
ends-ways-means nexus is also fundamental to formulating an EBP philosophy.”69  “If 
the means to an end do not exist then the end is by definition unrealistic.”70 
The proposed framework establishes a logical Effects-Based approach toward 
developing global or strategic and operational outcomes with an all-hazard focus that 
highlights a foundation incorporating stakeholder inclusion.  If the true focus is mission 
accomplishment, the drawbacks do not outweigh the benefits.  In light of the 
incongruities identified with the current DHS TCL input based approach, implementation 
of the enhanced framework is vital for the intended outcome of the current effort to be 
realized. 
Several elements have a direct cause and effect with regard to successful 
implementation of the enhanced framework.  The next chapter provides an overview of 
future issues that should be considered in developing an inclusive and comprehensive 
Effects-Based-Planning TO development effort. 
                                                 
69 Alan Stephens, “Strategy with Style – Effects Based Planning,” Strategic and Defense Centre 
Studies, (Summer 2006), http://rspas.anu.edu.au/papers/sdsc/analysis/Strategy_with_Style.pdf (accessed 
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70 Ibid., 6. 
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V. THE ROAD AHEAD 
The previous chapters identified some of the overarching system wide and 
internal incongruities or disconnects with the implementation and integration of the 
current Capability-Based-Planning (CBP) initiative toward developing Target 
Capabilities.  The proposed framework is designed to improve the current system.  The 
nation will need to decide whether to adopt the proposed framework outlined in Chapter 
IV.  If the choice is made to implement the proposed framework establishing an Effects-
Based-Planning (EBP) approach to developing Target Outcomes (TOs), the elements of 
this chapter will be important considerations. 
This chapter is a compendium of the areas of concentration recommended for 
consideration toward forging the “road ahead” to implementing the proposed framework 
and improving emergency management and homeland security preparedness efforts 
within in the United States.  The intent of the chapter is to suggest additional areas of 
consideration that will improve the implementation of the proposed framework, reducing 
incongruities or disconnects and providing the catalyst toward generating additional ideas 
or thoughts that will have a positive developmental impact.  The chapter discussion will 
focus on suggestions regarding framework implementation and process development, 
implementing a global strategic systems approach, developing a jurisdictional threshold 
roll up mechanism, contemplating a new approach to allocating resources and 
considering German collaborative and cooperative efforts or initiatives. 
A. FRAMEWORK IMPLEMENTATION - PROCESS DEVELOPMENT 
The current Department of Homeland Security (DHS) capabilities initiative has 
been plagued by a top-down driven approach.  The approach has been, at best, mere 
consultation with the stakeholders responsible for implementing the initiative.  In order 
for the proposed framework to be accepted universally, a collaborative grass roots 
approach is necessary.  The stakeholders must have an understanding of the new 
framework; agree to its tenants; be empowered with the ability to modify the model 
integrating stakeholder insights; and, be an integral part of the implementation design.  
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This vetting process is critical to the framework success and sustainability.  The proposed 
framework must be reviewed by targeted subject matter experts.  Targeted participants 
need to include emergency management and homeland security subject matter experts 
including federal, state, territorial, local, and tribal government; first responder discipline 
representatives; private industry and voluntary partners.  The suggested vetting process 
format consists of conducting a series of facilitated working groups across the country to 
roll out the proposed framework.  These sessions will fill several purposes.  First, the 
gatherings will introduce the new framework to the stakeholders allowing them to 
understand the concepts and components.  Secondly, the work groups will scrutinize the 
framework and provide new ideas toward the development of the final product.  Third 
and of utmost importance, the stakeholders will be an integral part of designing the 
process for the development and implementation of the new framework and its 
accompanying strategic and tactical mission oriented elements.  The process must be 
realistic, aligned with, and not counterproductive to implementation requirements faced 
by each group of stakeholders.  It is imperative that one guiding process document is 
developed from the grass roots level.  The current DHS guiding documents have not been 
developed collaboratively resulting in many incongruities.  These incongruities have a 
direct cause and effect relationship impeding the success of the current Target 
Capabilities List (TCL) initiative.  The integration of all elements into one document 
developed collaboratively will eliminate the incongruities and achieve implementation 
consensus with some sense of standardization. 
B. GLOBAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS APPROACH 
The incongruities identified in Chapter I and II exemplify the need for integration 
and a process to highlight system elements that need adjustment to enhance the outcome 
of the proposed framework.  Some system elements may need to be eliminated, altered, 
or created to improve the effectiveness of developing TOs.  The key to the success of 
such an effort resides in the identification and comparison of the elements that will lead 
to improving program implementation.  A global approach is worthy of consideration 
based on the need to integrate the involvement of such a diverse array of stakeholders  
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that are an integral component of the current emergency management and homeland 
security arena.  The following material is one of many potential avenues to address this 
subject and by all means, not the panacea; however, it is worthy of consideration. 
It is prudent to consider the system holistically in an effort to maximize the 
effectiveness of the key elements.  The intent of the effort is to establish a guide for 
improving the effectiveness of the new framework referencing the challenges faced under 
the current DHS CBP development.  The elements considered are derived from the 
proposed framework, current DHS initiatives and the discoveries highlighted in Chapters 
I, II, III, and IV.  Several models may exist and be very applicable to formalizing or 
organizing the elements identified.  For the purpose of this discussion; however, the 
suggested model is based on Blue Ocean Strategy creating value innovation.  In simple 
terms, Blue Ocean Strategy is focused on revision and creating value or a new demand 
not otherwise realized in any other format or market.71  The entire strategy centers around 
four principles: eliminating, reducing, raising, and creating targeted system elements to 
improve a process or program.  These principles and the corresponding target elements 
result in the creation of an action grid.  The target elements were identified based on the 
discoveries of this thesis and the author’s 17 years of experience dealing with emergency 
management and homeland security issues or programmatic development.  The elements 
may not be all inclusive; however, they provide a starting point for the discussion in 
developing a global strategic systems approach laying the groundwork for potential 
improvements. 
The “action grid” delineating these principles and target elements in reference to 






                                                 
71 W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School 
Publishing Corporation, 2005), 23-44. 
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The next challenge is transforming the “action grid” elements into a strategy 
canvas graphically depicting a comparison of the elements between the current DHS CBP 
initiative and the proposed framework EBP approach. 
The following strategy canvas depicts system elements highlighting the relative 


















































Diagram 5. Proposed Framework Strategy Canvas 
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The “value proposition” consists of those elements marked by the colored areas of 
the canvas.  These elements raise or create positive enhancements.  The true “value 
innovation” is marked by the green area of the canvas.  These elements create the marked 
difference that has not been attainable in the past outdistancing the approach from any 
other efforts attempted by the discipline. 
C. JURISDICTIONAL THRESHOLD ROLL UP MECHANISM 
Once the framework’s strategic global and operational outcomes and 
corresponding elements are developed among all the stakeholders, one aspect of 
achieving value innovation will include the analysis of the jurisdictional thresholds 
identified during the framework development.  A mechanism will need to be developed 
to provide a roll up of the thresholds with regard to their respective jurisdictions: state, 
territorial, local, or tribal.  Compiling these breakpoints and the types of required 
resources will provide critical planning and resource information regarding the readiness 
or preparation needed amongst the partner agencies to provide for timely resource 
deployments.  This gap analysis is critical to the ultimate success of the proposed 
framework and has a value added benefit that will allow for readiness and budget 
prioritization, more efficient use of grant resources, identification of creative 
development efforts, the initiation of new approaches, the regionalization of resources 
and provide the information necessary to institutionalize a revised performance 
measurement mechanism. 
D. A NEW APPROACH TO ALLOCATING RESOURCES 
If all the pieces to the system approach align themselves in the appropriate 
manner, we may have the opportunity to consider a new approach to allocating resources 
improving response timeliness.  The collaboration and development outcome will allow 
for the consideration of another possible approach to providing resources.  The current 
resource system is based on a tiered response triggered by a given entity breaching its 
capability.  Instead of relying on a breach in capability, partnering agencies could 
collaborate to determine which resources, at whatever level, are best suited to assisting 
the local entity toward achieving the necessary missions.  Knowing the gaps or thresholds 
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ahead of time would promote state, regional, and national resource allocation planning 
efforts to improve resource allocation efficiencies.  Front loading the response in such a 
manner will have the potential to drastically reduce resource deployment timeframes, 
improve response assistance coordination, and potentially minimize the magnitude of 
recovery assistance required. 
The new approach could be the catalyst for the consideration of an enhanced 
declaration process.  The declaration process could be reengineered to have a two tiered 
implementation process: response and recovery.  With the collaboration of resources well 
developed and jurisdictional breakpoints identified, a response declaration could be done 
immediately releasing operational agency funds for resource deployment and mutual aid 
provisions.  The second tier of the declaration would follow later triggering recovery 
assistance focused on the required thresholds, the magnitude of damages, and whether 
support was necessary through local, state, tribal, or federal programmatic venues. 
E. GERMAN COLLABORATIVE AND COOPERATIVE EFFORTS  
Anytime an initiative is being developed, I find it beneficial to look outside the 
box and consider other similar efforts by like entities.  To achieve this goal, a 
comparative study of governments closely resembling the United States focused on 
Germany to research the subject of collaboration and cooperation that may enhance 
current capabilities or proposed outcomes.  Germany is the discovery country because its 
government structure is very similar to that of the United States.  The Federal Republic of 
Germany is a democratic system.  The system is guided by the “Basic Law” similar to a 
constitution.  The government consists of the federal government and sixteen autonomous 
state governments called “Bundeslanders.”  The system is founded on a division of 
powers similar to the United States.  The responsibility for limiting the power of the state 
and conducting the checks and balances is divided between various branches of 
government: legislative, executive, and the judiciary.  The German Budestag, parliament, 
is the center of the political mechanism housed in Berlin.72  Since Germany is part of the 
                                                 
72 German Budestag, http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/parliament/index.html (accessed February 23, 
2008). 
  92
European Union (EU), it is prudent to consider EU collaborative efforts between its 
“federal government” in Brussels, the “states,” and the member countries of the EU.  The 
following material will discover EU and proprietary German collaborative and 
cooperative efforts.   
1. European Union Efforts 
Germany is a key partner in the EU with 26 other countries: Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  The initiatives 
implemented by the EU to facilitate cooperation began in 1999 with the Amsterdam 
Treaty.  The process focused on strategic and operational coordination with a rapid and 
integrated needs assessment capability.  The key to its success is linking national and 
regional initiatives in close coordination with military operations.  Several efforts were 
undertaken in an effort to achieve effective cooperation and collaboration: 
• The Helsinki European Council ensures the coordination of EU member 
state resources.  They developed a Committee for Civilian Aspects of 
Crisis Management in 2000 to oversee the management of civilian 
operations.73 The new committee was charged with facilitating the 
coherence between EU pillars and a rapid response between the Union and 
member states.  One of their key elements is developing the clarity in EU 
political objectives.  This effort is emerging with the intent of managing 
multifaceted challenges.  The prospective outcome is to establish EU 
elements that are complimentary, adaptable, and flexible depending on the 
situation.  A civilian capability improvement plan between the EU 
members was adopted in 2006.  The enhanced focus is a needs oriented 
approach, not unlike mission development during an incident. 
• “The European Security Strategy (ESS) agreed upon by the European 
Council in 2003, specifically calls for a more coherent approach.”74  These 
initiatives all affect the European Security Defense Policy of the Union 
and the member states.  Role of Civil Society (RoSC) efforts are underway 
to flesh out the parameters for improving coordination and concentrating  
 
                                                 
73 Institute of Security Studies, Civilian Crisis Management: The EU Way (Paris, France: EU Institute 
for Security Studies, 2006), http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/chai90.pdf (accessed February 23, 
2008), 25. 
74 Ibid., 105. 
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on peace building, policy coherence, cooperation and effective 
partnerships.75  The key elements behind this initiative are the planning 
and implementation among all organizations in a holistic approach. 
• Some EU efforts parallel the United States Emergency Management 
Assistance Compact (EMAC) initiative.  The EU plan goes one-step 
further by actually targeting specific resource disciplines coordinated 
between the countries that can be deployed within a short amount of time.  
For example, “The European Council in Feira identified concrete targets 
for the police: 5000 police officers available for international police 
missions, with 1000 of them deployable within 30 days.”76  In a similar 
fashion, several of the EU countries banded together in 2004 to establish a 
police response unit that will deploy a rapid reaction force of 800 men.  
The unit is headquartered in Vicenza, Italy.77  
The civil military relationship is definitely a central focal point among the EU members.  
“At the international level, there is an emerging recognition that government departments 
and agencies, the armed forces, education and training institutions, national NGOs, 
representative offices from, IOs,  UN agencies and the private sector all need to work 
together more closely with respect to national contributions to international peace 
operations.”78  The EU focus is well established and the coordination is still in the 
formative stages among member countries.  The effort’s effectiveness will emerge as the 
coordination and clarity in objectives improves among the members.  The key to success 
will be the acceptance of the efforts through the treaty between all the partners. 
A unique feature of the EU is an organization called EUROPOL.  “Europol is the 
European Union Law Enforcement Organisation that handles criminal intelligence.  Its 
mission is to assist the law enforcement authorities of Member States in their fight 
                                                 
75 Presidency of the European Union, Partners in Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management: EU 
and NGO Cooperation (Berlin, Germany: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2007), 
http://www.cmi.fi/?content=oldprojects, (accessed February 24, 2008), 13. 
76 Institute of Security Studies, Civilian Crisis Management: The EU Way (Paris, France: EU Institute 
for Security Studies, 2006), http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/chai90.pdf (accessed February 23, 
2008), 22. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Catrion Gourlay, Enhancing Cooperation between Civil Society and EU Civilian Crisis 
Management in the Framework of ESDP (Berlin, Germany: Gummerus Kirjapaino Oy Juvaskyla, 2006), 
32, http://www.cmi.fi/?content=oldprojects (accessed February 23, 2008).  
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against serious forms of organized crime.”79  The agency is like the mother of all 
intelligence agencies.  It works very closely with states, member countries, and law 
enforcement in the fight against crime.  The management of EUROPOL is the 
responsibility of a board.  The board is comprised of delegates from each member state.  
The board meets a couple of times a year to develop strategic elements and reports to the 
European Council.  The council is responsible for EUROPOL oversight and is comprised 
of the ministers for Justice and Home Affairs.  Member states provide representatives to a 
Joint Supervisory Body that ensures individual’s rights are maintained and monitors data 
collection efforts.80 
2. Germany’s Proprietary Efforts 
The foundation of Germany’s structure for dealing with terrorism is quite 
different from the United States.  Germany does not have a dedicated ministry dealing 
with terrorism.  The construct of their structure shows that the responsibilities are 
separated out between ministries: 
While the establishment of the Coordination Center is thought to have 
facilitated cooperation among federal, state, and local authorities, no 
central agency or person is in charge of all “homeland security” efforts.  
The most important domestic security and intelligence authorities, the 
BKA and BfV, are still divided among one federal and 16 state bureaus.  
The state bureaus work independently of each other and independently of 
the federal bureaus.  Furthermore, German law requires a complete 
organizational separation between federal law enforcement agencies such 
as the BKA and state police agencies, and between federal and state 
intelligence authorities such as the BfV.  An interagency group made up of 
the appropriate ministries, the heads of the BKA, BfV, BND, MAD, and 
the Attorney General conduct weekly briefings in the Federal Chancellery 
and provide strategic direction.81 
The German government has undertaken many efforts with regard to border and aviation 
security, immigration, terrorist funding stream restriction and developed various laws to 
                                                 
79 EUROPOL, European Law Enforcement Cooperation - Director’s Introduction, 
http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=introduction (accessed March 30, 2008). 
80 Ibid. 
81 Congressional Research Service, European Approaches to Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006), 
https://www.llis.dhs.gov/docdetails/details.do?contentID=18513 (accessed February 27, 2008), 22. 
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deal with extremists and terrorism.  The literature speaks to the necessity for 
coordination, however, there are no focused efforts identified to improve collaboration 
because the states are leery of loosing their authority due to centralization efforts.   
The German structure for dealing with other disasters, in general, is similar to the 
United States’ framework.  “The German approach to dealing with incidents, whether 
natural disasters or terrorist acts, is bottom-up, beginning at the local level, bringing in 
the state if necessary, and finally calling in federal agencies if they are needed.”82  After 
9/11 and floods in 2002, the German government established a Federal Office for Civil 
Protection and Disaster Response (BBK), within the Ministry of Interior, to coordinate 
approaches between the state and federal government.  They designated the Ministry of 
Interior as the entity with the government’s coordination responsibility.  The BBK in 
coordination with the state(s) assumes coordination responsibility if a single state is 
overwhelmed or the event involves more than one state.  “In the event of a national 
military crisis, thirteen different federal ministries have responsibility for aspects of civil 
emergency planning and response, coordinated by the Ministry of the Interior.”83  There 
were no specific initiatives identified as the catalyst to improve coordination and 
collaboration between the ministries for homeland security or disaster related events. 
The research of German government systems identified two measures that were 
specifically targeted toward improved cooperation and collaboration.  The Ministry of the 
Interior has undertaken an effort to enhance coordination from an administrative 
standpoint through an improved eGovernment system.  The system is designed to reduce 
duplication and streamline the bureaucracy.  A value added component of the system is 
“to facilitate electronic communication between citizens, companies and public 
authorities, citizens’ portals that meet defined security and confidentiality requirements 
being provided by private or public providers, creating a secure electronic 
                                                 
82 Congressional Research Service, European Approaches to Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism, 20. 
83 Ibid., 23. 
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communication area on the Internet.”84  The initiative may have some promise for 
ministry cooperation and collaboration; however, there were no evident benefits for 
disaster or terrorism events. 
The Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) “Igniting Ideas” 
initiative has been touted as the foundation for success in Germany.  The Federal 
Government has defined a national strategy for innovation policy through its high-tech 
strategy.  The goal is partners in business, science, and politics work together to meet the 
challenges posed by the global market.  The high-tech strategy defines the aims of this 
collaboration and defines new types of cooperation.85  The initiative behind this 
movement is called “Futur.”  The BMBF realizes, “No one must be left out!  In order to 
achieve this goal, we need more precise scientific knowledge about learning processes 
and a competition to find the most effective methods.”86  This effort is guided by the 
Innovation Council.  The initiative begins with specific objectives in an effort to produce 
an interdisciplinary and integrated problem solving approach utilizing the internet as the 
communication medium.  The initiative is based on global inclusion, to include the 
general citizenry, through the internet migrating to the development of focus groups.  The 
focus group experts deal with the issues pertinent to their field of expertise.  The outcome 
is a face-to-face meeting to develop the initiatives.  The Ministry is then charged with 
implementing the final initiatives.  “Interdisciplinary, problem-oriented "lead visions" 
(Leitvisionen) are supposed to be the major outcomes of the process, which shall reflect 
the demand for research and be translated into publicly funded research programmes or 
projects.”87  A pictorial of the process follows “The Futur Process”88 
                                                 
84 Federal Ministry of Interior, Focused on the Future: Innovations for Administration (Berlin, 
Germany: Federal Ministry of Interior, 2006), 
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85 Federal Ministry of Education and Research, A Profile of the Ministry (Berlin, Germany: 
Bundesministerium fur Bildung und Forschung/Federal Ministry of Education and Research, 2007), 
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86 Ibid., 2. 
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Diagram 6. The Futur Process 
The “Futur” initiative appears to show the most promise for developing a 
collaborative initiative among stakeholders to design systems, projects, and programs.  
The effort is in the infancy stages and has not been validated as to whether it will be 
applicable outside of the research discipline. 
Comparatively speaking, either the approaches used by the EU or Germany are 
applicable in the United States because the structure and implementation is so similar.  
Implementing any of the EU or German approaches would require some modification of 
the United States’ framework that could be supported by simple memorandum, executive 
order, presidential directive, or federal law.  Two initiatives stand out as possible 
solutions for the United States to improve collaboration.  The first initiative is a 
combination of the European Council’s efforts to forward deploy law enforcement 
integrating all resource providers and the EUROPOL criminal intelligence initiative with 
a prescriptive governance structure.  The EMAC system has already successfully 
coordinated state resource sharing during any event.  To include complete resource 
provider engagement, like the European Council law enforcement or EUROPOL 
initiatives, EMAC would need to be expanded to include the federal government.  The 
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inclusion could be done by simple memorandum of understanding between the states and 
the federal government.  This effort would allow resource sharing among all states and 
the federal government to support a local event.  The effort would require some minor 
modification of the governance structure, ordering, and deployment procedures to 
continue the same level of efficiency. 
The second initiative that offers promise as a model to improve collaboration in 
the United States is the German BMBF hi-tech strategy centered on the “Futur” process.  
The system definitely speaks to cooperation and collaboration among all potential 
stakeholders.  The process appears to have the components of inclusion, deliberation, and 
effective implementation.  The formation of such an initiative in the United States could 
be developed and implemented by the federal government.  The initiative would require 
no special promulgation to implement.  The effort could be done through agency 
directive, policy or the DHS Science and Technology division. 
F. SUMMARY 
The system for cooperation and collaboration in the development of DHS efforts 
has many incongruities.  The incongruities in program development and guidance 
application impede developing collaborative global efforts between and among federal, 
state, territorial, local, and tribal entities.  Current approaches are not truly collaborative 
in nature and default to consultation as the primary focus.  The “Road Ahead,” 
approached strategically with diligence and deliberation, provides many enhancement 
opportunities toward the development of a cooperative and collaborative global system.  
The thought of a collaborative and integrated global system has many promising 
attributes whose synergy will result in more effective and efficient mechanisms that are 
universally understood and accepted.  The result will be a revitalized and improved 




A critical component of multi-agency coordination for given initiatives relies on 
engaging the participating entities and defining the intended outcome at the onset.  I 
reflect back on the development of a major exercise that began with all good intentions.  
Multiple agencies began providing inputs to develop the event and all their good ideas 
started the snowball rolling.  Before long, the development started to venture off in 
several directions and the magnitude of the exercise was on the verge of being 
unmanageable.  Agencies were disconnected and each started to build their own inputs or 
components expanding the parameters of the exercise even further.  Soon, no one 
understood the reason for the exercise, what the outcome was supposed to achieve, or 
whether enough funds existed to conduct the initiative.  Time was extremely short and 
tempers were beginning to flare as the development was six months into its 14-month 
timeline.  There exercise was doomed to fail due to lack of cohesion and direction.  The 
management team finally regrouped and collectively identified the intended outcome.  
Strategies were developed to achieve the outcome engaging all participating agencies in 
the development.  The exercise organization and direction changed from an input based 
approach to an outcome or mission defined derivative and the event went off as a huge 
success; the unity of vision was very apparent.  
Even though the current Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Capability-
Based-Planning (CBP) approach to developing capabilities is well intended, the project is 
not without its shortfalls.  The foundation documents and guidance express the intended 
outcome, however, lack of clarity and confusion continue to surface.  The incongruities 
are detractors that severely impede the success of the initiative.  The input based 
approach is not mission oriented or indicative of a collaborative effort among the 
responsible stakeholders.  This approach is a prescription for internal element conflict 
and the development of a disjointed effort.  
The results of a nationwide survey expressed concern regarding the current DHS 
CBP approach to developing capabilities.  The respondents indicated they understood the 
intent of the current initiative and agreed a guiding tool is useful.  They did not agree that 
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the current initiative is the most appropriate to achieve the intended outcome.  The results 
divulged that the capabilities development was non-collaborative, top-down driven, too 
cumbersome and overly complex.   
The respondents identified elements to successfully developing capabilities 
required: 
• A national concept. 
• A functional systems approach. 
• Mission-oriented outcomes. 
• Providing a simple, realistic, and consistent approach. 
• Applying an all-hazard philosophy with jurisdictional application of risks 
and threats. 
• Scalability to account for jurisdictional differences. 
• A collaborative grass roots approach among the stakeholders: federal, 
state, local, and tribal governments. 
The criticality to fulfilling the mission is defining the gaps and targeting the necessary 
resources to satisfy the need. 
The proposed Effects-Based framework for developing global or strategic and 
operational Target Outcomes provides a logical approach.  The framework relies on an 
effects-based approach as the primary driving force.  The mission is supported by a goal 
and subsequent strategies.  The entire focus is outcome or effects based integrating the 
necessary inputs through the strategy areas and their subsequent development.  The result 
is an integrated system for developing Target Outcomes.  The integrated system 
accommodates all the main theme elements identified by stakeholders in their respective 
survey responses.  The framework integrates the primary effects-based concept with other 
applicable methodologies creating a hybrid approach to developing Target Outcomes.  
Integration of the other methodologies is critical, as they are complementary to primary 
federal directives. 
The key to developing a successful national system with this framework will 
require the execution of a true grass roots collaborative effort among federal, state, local, 
and tribal governments.  The development and implementation will require incorporating 
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all of the pertinent elements from the current DHS Capabilities initiative and those 
elements identified in Chapter V – “The Road Ahead.”  This approach will foster 
developing an initiative applicable to all levels of engagement.  The beauty of its 
execution will deniably be successful, as it will incorporate the missing components of 
most federal efforts.  These components are the foundation of success to any initiative as 
implied in the exercise example above: unity of vision and equity of partnership.  The 
benefit of implementing the proposed framework and its corresponding elements will be 
the rebuilding of the fragile government credibility.  Stephen Covey expresses the 
importance of the credibility factor best: “At the end of the day, if the results aren’t there, 
neither is the credibility and neither is the trust.  It’s just that simple; it’s just that 
harsh.”89 
                                                 
89 Stephen Covey, The Speed of Trust (New York, NY: Free Press, 2006), 110. 
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APPENDIX B – KEY MILESTONES 
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APPENDIX C- ACRONYMS 
ANSI  American National Standards Institute 
BBK Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Response 
BMBF  Federal Ministry of Education and Research 
CAR  Capability Assessment for Readiness 
CBP  Capability-Based-Planning 
DHS  Department of Homeland Security 
DOD  Department of Defense 
EBP  Effects-Based-Planning 
EMAC  Emergency Management Assistance Compact 
EMAP  Emergency Management Accreditation Program 
ESF  Emergency Support Function 
ESS  European Security Strategy 
EU  European Union 
FEMA  Federal Emergency Management Agency 
FOG  Field Operations Guide 
GAO  Government Accountability Office 
GHSAC  Governor’s Homeland Security Advisory Council 
HSAC  Homeland Security Advisory Council 
HSEEP  Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Program 
HSPD 5  Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 
HSPD 8  Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 
IAEM  International Association of Emergency Managers 
ICS  Incident Command System 
IMSWG  Incident Management Standards Working Group 
MCA  Montana Code Annotated 
NEMA  National Emergency Management Association 
NFPA  National Fire Protection Association 
NGA  National Governor’s Association 
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NGO  Non Government Organization 
NIC  National Integration Center 
NIMS  National Incident Management System 
NPG  National Preparedness Goal 
NRF  National Response Framework 
NRP  National Response Plan 
PCA  Pilot Capability Assessment 
PNL  Pacific National Laboratories 
S & T  Science and Technology 
SHSGP  State Homeland Security Grant Program 
TCL  Target Capabilities List 
TO  Target Outcomes 
UTL  Universal Task List 
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